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The Capital Markets in Transition:
A Response to New SEC Rule 144At
KELLYB Y. TESTY*
Whenever the fingers are burned, a cure is always lustily called for
. [T]hey call
by those who have been burned the most severely
for
a government officer, who shall from time to time regulate
how they shall hold their hands to the fire without being burned.
Whether this special interference shall be crowned with success by
keeping down the heat of the fire, or by increasing the distance at
which the venturesome hand shall be allowed to approach it, is a
. [I]f the heat
perplexing difficulty which has not yet been solved.
of the fire should be kept so low, or the distance from it so great,
as that no hands can be burned, why then there will be no fun in the
thing, and the government officer will enjoy a sinecure.'
INTRODUCTION
The Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC" or "Commission"),

since rising from the ashes of the stock market crash of 1929-1932,2 has
t © Copyright 1990 by Kellye Y. Testy.
* J.D. Candidate, I991, Indiana Umversity School of Law at Bloomington; B.A., 1982,
Indiana Umversity at Bloomington.
1. B. HuNT, TE DEvLoPmENT oF THE BusINEss CORPORATION IN ENGLAND 1800-1867,
at 115 (1936) (quoting a tract published m London in 1850 under the pseudonym of Danel
Hardcastle).
2. The SEC was created at the conclusion of the Senate Banking and Currency Committee's
1932-1934 investigation of stock exchange practices, usually known as the Pecora Hearings in
recognition of the role played by the Committee's counsel, Ferdinand Pecora. The purpose of
the Pecora Hearings was to determine why the devastating decreases in security values had
occurred during 1929-1932 and to propose legislation to prevent another stock market crash.
Stock Exchange Practices:Hearings Before the Senate Banking Comm., 72d and 73d Congs.
(1932-1934). The 1929-1932 crash caused the value of all stocks listed on the New York Stock
Exchange to shrink from a total of nearly $90 billion to just under $16 billion-a loss of
83%-between September 1, 1929 and July 1, 1932. SENATE BANKING Comm., STOCK EXCHANGE
PRAcTicEs REPORT, S. R.E. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1934).
The key regulatory safeguards put in place to prevent another crash were the Securities Act
of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa
(1988)) [hereinafter Securities Act, the Act, or the 1933 Act], and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk
(1988)) [hereinafter Exchange Act or the 1934 Act]. In basic terms, the Securities Act regulates
the initial distribution of securities by issuers to investors, while the Exchange Act regulates
the securities exchange markets and was actually the legislation that created the SEC. See
generally R. JENNINGS & H. MAmSH, SEcuRriFs REGULATION CASEs AND MATERIALS 37-44

(1987).
Although the scope of this Note permits only brief consideration of regulatory parameters
outside of the Securities Act and the Exchange Act, four other statutes also fall within the
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undertaken the task of keeping "hands from being burned" in connection
with the workings of the United States capital markets.3 Several scholars
have documented the SEC's ability to respond to the needs of the financial
marketplace, 4 with arguably the most comprehensive documentary concluding that the SEC has been a regulatory success story during its first
half-century. 6 The wisdom of recent SEC policies is, however, very much
open to debate. Indeed, the SEC's ability to succeed as Wall Street's
watchdog in its second half-century now demands attention.
Rule 144A 7 is one recent SEC effort to respond to a changing financial
marketplace, and as such it represents an opportunity to assess the quality of that response. Rule 144A removes restrictions on the ability of

regulatory ambit of the SEC: the Public Utilities Holding Company Act of 1935, Pub. L. No.
74-333, 49 Stat. 803 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6 (1988)); the Trust
Indenture Act of 1939, Pub. L. No. 76-253, 53 Stat. 1149 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77aaa-77bbbb (1988)); the Investment Company Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat.
789 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-1 to 80a-64 (1988)); and the Investment Advisors
Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-768, 54 Stat. 847 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-I
to 80b-21 (1988)). See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra, at 44-47. The Banking Act of 1933,
ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), also had
significant impact on the securities industry in that the relevant sections, known as GlassSteagall, separated commercial and investment banking activities. For a history of this Act,
see Perkins, The Divorce of Commercial and Investment Banking: A History, 88 BANKING
L.J. 483 (1971). See also infra note 46 for a discussion of the relevance of Glass-Steagall in
the contest for private placement business between commercial banks and investment banking
firms.
3. In commemorating the SEC's 25th anmversary in 1959, Milton Freeman, of Arnold,
Fortas and Porter, Washington, D.C., wrote that the SEC
has helped to restore the once shattered public confidence in the financial
community and at the same time to foster a process of elevating the moral tone
of that community. The changed conditions in the securities markets
are in
a not insubstantial measure the result of the acts which the Commission administers and the way in which they have been administered.
Freeman, A Practitioner'sView of the SEC, 28 GEo. WASH. L. REv 14, 14 (1960).
4. J.K. GALBRAITH, TE GREAT CRASH (3d ed. 1972); H. HoovER, Tim GREAT DEPRESSION
1929-1941 (1952); A. SCHLESINGER, THm CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER (1957); J. SELiGMAN, Tim
TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET (1982); R. SOBEL, Tim GREAT BULL MARKET (1968).
5. See J. SELIGMAN, supra note 4. Seligman provides a comprehensive history of the SEC
and its relationship to corporate finance, covering the years 1929-1977. Id. at ix.
6. J. SELIGMAN, supra note 4, at 568 (calling the SEC an outstanding example of the
independent commission at its best).
7 Rule 144A was initially proposed in Securities Act Release No. 6806, 42 SEC Docket
76 (CCH) (Oct. 25, 1988) [hereinafter Release No. 6806]; reproposed in Securities Act Release
No. 6839, 43 SEC Docket 2027 (CCH) (July 11, 1989) [hereinafter Release No. 6839]; and
adopted substantially as reproposed in Securities Act Release No. 6862, 46 SEC Docket 26
(CCH) (Apr. 23, 1990) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (1990)) [hereinafter Release
No. 6862].
Citations to Rule 144A throughout this Note will be to the Code of Federal Regulations
(C.F.R.), although the applicable C.F.R. volume's update was pending at publication time.
The amendments and additions to the C.F.R. brought about upon the adoption of Rule 144A
and related amendments to Rules 144 and 145 are contained in Release No. 6862, supra, and
may also be found at 55 Fed. Reg. 17,933 (Apr. 30, 1990).
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institutional investors 8 to trade securities that are not subject to the regis-

tration provisions of the Securities Act of 1933. 9 Under Rule 144A, whichl °
has been called "the most important step the SEC has taken in 50 years,"P
securities acquired in a private placement," or otherwise restricted, 12 are per

se exempted from a holding period requirement if resold to a "qualified

institutional buyer." ' 13 The absence of a holding period requirement is
expected to improve liquidity in the private placement secondary market. 14 In promulgating Rule 144A, the Commission recognized two per-

sistent trends"i that are revolutionizing the nation's capital markets. One

8. See infra notes 21-28 and accompanying text (institutional investor defined).
9. The registration requirement of the Securities Act is contained in § 5. 15 U.S.C. § 77e.
See infra notes 57-92 and accompanying text for a discussion of the statutory context in which
Rule 144A operates.
10. Maher, A New Spin on Global Markets?, INVESTMENT DEALES' Dia., Dec. 11, 1989,
at 23, 25.
11. A private placement contrasts with a public offering, which must be registered with
the SEC under § 5 of the Securities Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 77e. From its inception, the Securities
Act of 1933 has focused on distinguishing between public and private offerings. One of the
Act's drafters, James M. Landis (who served as Chairman of the SEC from 1935-1937 and
as Dean of the Harvard Law School from 1937-1946), emphasized this distinction in describing
is participation in the Act's drafting sessions: "It was these discussions that first evolved the
exact scope that we wanted the Securities Act to cover. 'Public offering' as distinguished from
'private offerings' proved to be the answer." Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities
Act of 1933, 28 GEo. WASH. L. REv 29, 37 (1960). For further discussion of the normative
rationale underlying the Act, see infra text at notes 55-70. The definition of what constitutes
a private placement continues to draw considerable debate. For a discussion of this issue, see
infra text accompanying notes 37-40.
12. See infra note 80.
13. Release No. 6839, supra note 7, at 2027. See infra notes 93-123 and accompanying
text for a detailed discussion of Rule 144A's operation.
14. Release No. 6806, supra note 7, at 85; see H. BLoomENTHAL, EmErRowmo

TRENDS iN

SEcuRmrs LAW 8-20 to 8-24 (1989); Maher, Boom! A Year of Explosive Growth, INVESTMENT

DEALER.S' DiG., Mar. 27, 1989, at 14 (1988 private placement rankings) [hereinafter Maher,

Boom.]. See infra note 73 for a discussion of liquidity and its value in the private placement
market.

15. This Note singles out the two trends of increased institutional holdings and increased
private placement activity. However, this choice is not meant to suggest that there are not
other dynamic changes occurring in the marketplace. Indeed, two other key trends that are
receiving an increasing amount of attention are internationalization (or globalization) and debtfor-equity replacement. See, e.g., SEcutrmas AND ExcHANGE COMM'N., INTERNATIONALIZATION
OF Tm SEcurrias MARKETs: REPORT TO TH SaNATE COM. ON BANKXNO, HousiNG AND
URBAN APFAiRs AND Ta HOUSE CoM. ON ENERoY AND Co
RCE, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1987); Leveraged Buyouts and CorporateDebt: Hearng Before the Senate Comm. on Finance,
101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989) (three part series). An in-depth discussion of these changes and
others, while also important in assessing the transformation of the capital markets, is beyond
the scope of this Note.
Internationalization, especially, is closely related to many of the topics that this Note
discusses. Indeed, Regulation S, which eases the ability of United States issuers to market
securities outside of the United States without being subject to the registration and disclosure
provisions of the United States securities laws, was promulgated by the SEC in tandem with
Rule 144A. Regulation S was proposed in Securities Act Release No. 6779, 41 SEC Docket
126 (CCH) (June 10, 1988), reproposed in Securities Act Release No. 6838, 43 SEC Docket
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trend is the increasing role that institutional investors are playing in the
public and private debt and equity markets. Institutions currently own
over 43% of all public common stocks, and their share is expected to
continue to increase.16 Secondly, the private placement market, the premer
institutional investor playground, is challenging the public market's share
of total corporate financings. The dollar volume of private placements
exploded from $70 billion in 1985 to $202 billion in 1988, accounting for
43% of total corporate financings in 1988.17 If current trends persist,
"[the last share of publicly traded common stock owned by an individual
will be sold in the year 2003."1is
In the wake of this explosive growth in the institutional and private
placement markets, the SEC has fanned the flame with Rule 144A. This
Note offers a critical assessment of whether the SEC's Rule 144A is an
appropriate response to the current marketplace by analyzing whether the
Rule will accomplish its intended regulatory objectives and by exploring
the costs and benefits to the efficiency of the capital markets that may
result. Part I examines the growth of the institutional and private markets,
emphasizing both quantitative data and the substantive effects of those

2008 (CCH) (July 11, 1989), and adopted in Securities Act Release No. 6863, 46 SEC Docket
52 (CCH) (Apr. 24, 1990).
Debt-for-equity replacement, spurred by hostile takeovers and leveraged buyouts, has received
perhaps more attention than any other issue in corporate finance. Most writers have focused
on corporate governance implications, tax policy issues, and the risk of bankruptcy. The issue
has garnered the attention of numerous legal disciplines (corporate, corporate finance, securities
regulation), tax academics, practitioners, and legislators, and has sparked interest m the public
finance and economic literature as well. See, e.g., LEVERAGED MANAGEMENT BuyoUTs (Y.
Amihud ed. 1989); KNiGHTs, RAmERs, AND TARGETS (J. Coffee, L. Lowenstein & S. RoseAckerman eds. 1988); Miller, The Modigliam-Miller Propositions After Thirty Years, 2 J.
ECON. PERsP.. 99 (Fall 1988); Leveraged Buyouts and Corporate Debt: Hearing Before the
Senate Comm. on Finance, supra; Tax Policy Aspects of Mergers and Acquisitions: Hearings
Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 101st Cong., ist Sess. (1989).
Many aspects of the tax treatment of debt and equity have received congressional attention.
See Oversight Hearings on the Role of Pension Funds in Corporate Takeovers: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations of the House Comm. on Education
and Labor, 101st Cong., IstSess. (1989); Management and Leveraged Buyouts: Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); Hearing on Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co.
Leveraged Buyouts Before the House Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (May 25, 1989).
16. Forum, The American Corporationand the Institutional Investor: Are There Lessons
from Abroad?, 1988 CoLUM. Bus. L. REV 739, 743 [hereinafter Forum]; Brancato, The Pivotal
Role of Institutional Investors in Capital Markets: A Summary of Economic Research at the
Columbia Institutional Investor Project 22 (June 14, 1990) (copy of unpublished manuscript
on file with the Indiana Law Journal) ("institutional investors hold about half the equity of
U.S. corporations").
17 Maher, Boom!, supra note 14, at 14-15.
18. Light, The Privatization of Equity, reprinted in Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARv Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 61, 62. Light admits that this forecast may be
fanciful, noting that "short-term trends never persist" but that "the basic direction [decreasing
public stock ownership in the United States] is clear." Id.
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growth trends. Part II presents the SEC's new Rule 144A, outlines its
operation, and examines its regulatory and normative basis. Part III then
critiques Rule 144A on two levels-as both a regulatory tool and a policy
instrument.
Finally, this Note posits in conclusion that Rule 144A is an appropriate
addition to the Securities Acts, but that it does not reach far enough in
addressing the needs of a changing financial marketplace. The SEC should
amend Rule 144A to align it more closely with the normative purposes
of the Securities Act of 1933 and with the demands of current business
practice. However, this Note also recogmzes that the issues surrounding
Rule 144A need attention through other avenues, and suggests additional
methods of responding to increasing institutionalization and privatization
that will enhance the efficiency of corporate governance and the capital
markets.
I.
A.

TRANSFORMATION TRENDS

Growing Dominance of the Institutional Investor

The impact of institutional investors on the capital markets and corporate decision-making processes has attracted widespread attention from
practitioners, regulators, and academics.1 9 While few would disagree that
institutions are playing an increasingly important role in the capital
markets, no one has been able to quantify this impact precisely 20 This
absence of fundamental analysis stems from two problems. First, the
definition of an institutional investor is elusive in a dynamic capital
market structure, not only within the United States, but even more so in
a global context. 21 Second, no single public source of data on institutional
investors currently exists. An overall assessment of the institutional
investor's role in the economy began just recently at Columbia University'

19. See, e.g., Forum, supra note 16 and sources cited therein; Papers Presented at the

Salomon Brothers Center and Rutgers Centers Conference on The Fiduciary Responsibilities
of InstitutionalInvestors (June 14-15, 1990) (copies on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
20. See, e.g., L. LOWENSTEIN, WHAT'S WRONG WITH WALL STItET 58 (1988) (noting that

at the end of 1986, institutions owned "about 45 percent of the almost $3 trillion of public
company stocks" although "[t]he precise amount of institutional ownership is difficult to
calculate, in part because of the lack of recent data and in part because of a definition that

sometimes, for example, includes bank trust accounts and investment advisory accounts, and
sometimes not.").
21. See Brancato & Gaughan, The Growth of Institutional Investors in U.S. Capital

Markets, Institutional Investor Project, Columbia Center for Law and Economuc Studies,
Columbia Umversity at iii (Nov. 1988) [hereinafter Project I]. One need only consider the
creative development of a myriad of financial investment instruments within the last few years
to appreciate how the players in capital markets change. Mutual funds, now one of the more
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School of Law. 22 The individuals conducting Columbia's Institutional

Investor Study Project (the "Project") note that their data "must be
painstakingly constructed from a wide variety of sources, few of which

provide consistent comparison. ' 23 The Project is currently working on
developing a concise data base that can be used for an on-going analysis
24
of the institutional investor's role in capital markets.

For purposes of analyzing the markets' increasing institutionalization,
this Note adopts the definition of institutional investor used by the
Project, which includes private pension funds, closed end investment
trusts, life insurance companies, property and casualty insurance companies, non-pension fund money managed by banks and foundation and
2
endowment funds, mutual funds, and state and local retirement funds.
In basic terms, the distinction between an institutional investor and an
individual investor revolves around the fact that money is being professionally-or institutionally-rather than individually managed. 26 This

basic arrangements, were new items in the early 1970s. Now, mortgage pools, other collateralized obligations and complex hybrid securities are popular. Junk bonds, see infra note 31,
which were first introduced by Drexel Burnham Lambert in the mid-1970s and enjoyed a
heyday in the 1980s, may have come full circle. See infra note 31. Pension funds, Employee
Stock Option Plans (ESOPs), and retirement funds (propelled by ERISA) have also entered
into the spotlight in recent years.
22. The Center for Law and Economic Studies at Columbia University School of Law (the
"Center"), in collaboration with the New York Stock Exchange (the "NYSE"), established
the Institutional Investor Study Project (the "Project") in 1988. The Project, which is
independently funded, is directed by Professor Louis Lowenstein of Columbia. Mr. Ira M.
Millstem, senior partner at Weil, Gotshal & Manges, is chairman of the board of advisors of
the Project. Lowenstein and Milistein describe the Project as "a major, long-term effort to
explore the large, growing, and increasingly contentious role of the institutional investor in
large, publicly-owned corporations." Forum, supra note 16, at 739. In the first work published
by the Project, Drs. Brancato and Gaughan discussed the Project's initial groundwork for
studying the institutional market, noting that there is "no one central data source available to
provide data on institutional investors in an organized and condensed form which would be
amenable to fruitful analysis." Project I, supra note 21, at 51. Many data bases compile data
on parts of the institutional market. There is little consistency among these sources. This
shortcoming is no doubt related to the initial problem of simply defining "institutional
investor." Project I, supra note 21, at iii.
23. Project I, supra note 21, at iii.
24. Telephone interview with Carol Koz, secretary to Professor Lowenstein of Columbia
University School of Law (Oct. 25, 1989); see Project I, supra note 21, at 51.
25. Project I, supra note 21, at 3.
26. Project I, supra note 21, at 3. This definition could understate the amount of money
that is invested institutionally. For example, the problem of defining "institutional investor"
becomes further complicated when new financial instruments and pools of investment funds
are formed, such as those amassed by certain investment banking houses for leveraged buyouts.
These funds represent momes that individuals delegate to an "institution" to manage so that
the individual does not make the investment decisions. In dynamic capital markets, however,
such pools are difficult to identify, much less quantify, and any definition of "institutional
investor" could be understated by any amounts from individuals which come under such
professional management and are not already classified under other categories such as pension
funds. Further, real estate holdings, a.category of increasing interest to institutional investors,
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distinction is relevant because one of the key factors the SEC uses in

assessing whether an investor requires the disclosure protection
of the
27
federal securities laws is that investor's level of sophistication.

Establishing a working definition of an institutional investor is but a
threshold issue. The more urgent issue is the nature and degree of the

institutional investor's impact on capital markets. Four principle quantitative measurements reflect this impact: (1) the amount of assets under

management by institutional investors, (2) the market value of institutional
holdings, (3) the trading volume of institutional investments, and (4) the

corporate ownership represented by institutional investor holdings. 28 Some
of the more revealing statistics about the institutional market's growth

include the Project's finding that total assets under the management of
institutional investors have more than doubled in value from $2.1 trillion
in 1981 to $4.6 trillion in 1987.29 Institutional holdings in individual
corporations have increased as well, with 47 of the top 50 United States

corporations (ranked by 1987 stock market value) having institutional
ownership in excess of 33%, and 27 out of 50 having institutional
ownership in excess of 50%.10 Although institutions generally have been
characterized as players in the debt market, 3 the Project estimates that

see Lowenstein, Pension Funds Rush Into Real Estate, Wall St. J., Aug. 22, 1988, at 6, col.
1,may be more difficult to track than listed securities. Also, a large market for certain
derivative products such as stock index futures, index options, and options on index futures
has developed, affording both institutional and individual investors a wide variety of choices
of instruments which may defy more traditional forms of asset allocation and categorization
in certain respects.
27. See infra text at notes 74-92.
28. These four measurements are used by the Project and also have been employed in
other attempts at quantifying the institutional market. See generally LowENsTEIN, supra note
20.
29. Project I, supra note 21, at i.
30. Project I, supra note 21, at ii.
31. See C. BRUCK, THE PREDATORS' BALL 129-30 (1988) (detailing institutions' participation
in the bond market, especially the junk bond market). The bond market has been the traditional
bastion of institutional investors. 'In 1989, the amount of investment grade debt issued
domestically was $109.4 billion, up from $94.6 billion in 1988. Non-investment grade debt
(junk bonds) issued in 1989 amounted to $25.2 billion, down from $27.8 billion in 1988.
Drexel Burnham Lambert was the lead underwriter of junk bonds in 1989 with a 38.7%
market share. Schultz, Risk Enters the Picture in 1989, INrvEsTMENT DEALERS' DIG., Jan. 8,
1990, at 26, 27.
As Bruck chromcles in Tam PREDATORS' BALL, supra, the junk bond market, masterminded
by Michael Milken and the firm of Drexel Burnham Lambert has been a favorite investment
vehicle for institutions, especially in generating leveraged buyout funds. Private placements of
junk bonds with institutions were "perfect for Milken's system of repayment of favors, and
rewards." C. BRUCK, supra, at 130. Currently, Drexel is m the midst of bankruptcy proceedings
and Milken has pleaded guilty to federal securities law violations. See, e.g., Belton, Exemployees Toast Drexel at 'Creditors' Ball,' USA Today, Aug. 17, 1990, at 2B, col. 2.
See S. CoTTL,

R. MURRAY & F BLOCK, GRAHAM AND DODD'S SECURITY ANALYsis 467

(5th ed. 1988), noting that junk bonds may be more properly characterized as equity, rather
than debt, interests in a firm, "a contingent claim not unlike a warrant or other means of
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as of 1986, institutions controlled almost 43% of the total market value
of equity holdings in the United States.3 2 Trading patterns also reveal the
increasingly dominant role of institutional investors. Increased size of
trades and turnover indicate the level of institutional activity. On the
New York Stock Exchange, total share volume increased from 1.6 billion
shares in 1965 to 47.8 billion shares in 1987, the average trade size
increased from 224 shares to 2,112 shares, and turnover rose from 16%
to 73% during the same period. 3
As the above data demonstrate, institutional investors are a formidable
clientele in the marketplace. If numbers alone were the sole judge of
power over corporate management, then CEOs would be consulting their
institutional investors about whether to use black or blue ink to sign
paychecks. Indeed, the concentrated power of institutions is well-suited
for resolving some of the problems of separation of ownership and control
in corporations identified by Berle and Means.3 4 However, institutional
investors' increasing power is under-utilized. Professor Lowenstein notes

participating in the future of an enterprise." Id., see also STAFF OF THE JT. COMM. ON TAX'N,
101ST CONG., IST SEss., FEDERAL INCOME TAX ASPECTS OF CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRucTUREs
35-37 (Comm. Print 1989) fhereinafter CORPORATE FINANCIAL STRucTUREs] (factors used to

distinguish debt from equity); Note, Using Risk Analysis to Classify Junk Bonds as Equity
for FederalIncome Tax Purposes, 66 IND. L.J. 273 (1990). The Graham and Dodd approach
to security analysis emphasizes fundamental or intrinsic values of securities which can be
uncovered through diligent analysis of firms. It argues that the "market's pricing mechanism
remains based to such a degree upon faulty and frequently irrational analytical processes that
the price of a security only occasionally coincides with the intrinsic value around which it
tends to fluctuate." S. COTTrE, R. MtruRy & F BLOCK, supra at xi.

32. Project I, supra note 21, at 13-14. This 43qo translates to a $1,327.2 billion market
value in equity holdings for institutional investors as of 1986. Id. at 14.
33. Project I, supra note 21, at 14-17 (figures derived by the Project from the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) Fact Book, 1988). Large block trading on the NYSE, defined as
trades of 10,000 shares or more, has also increased from 3.1% of reported volume in 1965 to
51.2% in 1987 which doubled 1985's figures. "[A]n average of 3,639 block trades crossed the
tape each day-roughly nine per. minute." Id. at 17.
However, the proportion of NYSE publicly traded stock activity by institutions declined
from 61.10 in 1985 to 49.6% in the first half of 1988. Id. at 16. This decrease arguably
reflects institutions' increasing movement into the private placement market or to other
investments such as real estate. For data on institutions' share of the private placement market,
see infra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
It is also significant that institutions account for a lesser percentage of activity on the
American Stock Exchange and the over-the-counter ("OTC") market than on the Big Board
(NYSE). Project I, supra note 21, at 14-17 This phenomenon is perhaps explained by
institutions' demands for liquidity and their perceptions that the NYSE offers greater liquidity
than do other exchanges or trading systems. See infra note 73.
34. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).

Since Berle and Means' classic exposition, a debate has raged over the problem of shareholders
monitoring management. See, e.g., Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial
Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976); Coffee,
Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate Web, in KNIOHTS, RAIDERS, AND
TARGETS, supra note 15, at 77 This debate has intensified due to the divergence of opimon
about the value of takeovers, management buyouts, and other corporate control transactions.
See generally KNIGHTS, RAIDERS, AND TARGETS, supra note 15.
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that institutions, despite hopes to the contrary, have not been a factor in
corporate governance.35 Part III of this Note argues that institutions are
positioned to take an active role in corporate governance and suggests an
agenda for modifying existing law to encourage more active management
oversight by institutional investors.3 6
B.

The Growing Private Placement Market

Definitional problems similar to those encountered in assessing the
impact of the institutional investor arise when analyzing the private
placement market. As new types of securities3 7 and methods of marketing
those instruments emerge, defining and measuring the private placement
market becomes increasingly difficult. One Wall Street source commented
that "[tihe advent of swaps, options, the bank loan syndication market,
and the junk bond market have all -caused any serious player to look
upon [the private placement market] and redefine it in different ways." '3
The only publicly available source for data on private placements defines
a private placement as "a non-registered security placed by an agent with
non-bank, third party investors ...hav[ing] a maturity of at least one
year. ' 39 This definition is under-inclusive but nevertheless is useful for

35. L. LOwENsTm , supra note 20, at 57-58 (1988).
For the past thirty years, the ownership of American public corporations has
become increasingly concentrated, thus encouraging hopes that the insurance
compames, pension funds, investment compames, and other institutional investors
would, by taking an active role, protect not only their own interests but those
of shareholders generally. All the ingredients seemed to be there. They own large
blocks of stock, some of them as much as $100 million in a single company.
They have the staffs and the sophistication. As it turned out, however, the money
managers have contributed almost nothing to the direction or oversight of the
compames whose stocks they so bnefly hold.
Id. But see infra note 186 (developments indicating that institutional investors are becoming
more aggressive in corporate governance matters).
36. See mnfra text at notes 157-95.
37. A security is defined in the Act at § 2(1). 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1988). What constitutes
a security is not as straightforward as one might first imagine. The debate over what types of
investments are securities, and thus subject to the protection and sanctions of the federal
securities laws, has engendered a substantial body of case law and commentary. See, e.g.,
Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985); SEC v. W J. Howey Co., 328 U.S.
293 (1946); Arnold, "When is a Car a Bicycle?" and Other Riddles: The Definition of a
Security Under the FederalSecurities Laws, 33 CLE-v. ST. L. Rav 449 (1984-1985); Schneider,
The Elusive Definition of a Security, 14 Sac. REG. REV 981 (1981).
38. Maher, Boom!, supra note 14, at 20 (comments of Rob Lawrence, vice-president and
director of private placements at Citicorp).
39. Maher, Is the Party Over?, INvEsTmNT DEALERs' DiG., Sept. 4, 1989, at 13, 19. The
data reported in Investment Dealers' Digest is compiled by IDD Information Services, Inc.
The SEC does not compile this information itself (or at least not publicly). Id. at 20. In the
proposing release for Rule 144A, the SEC relied on the data compiled by IDD and published
in Investment Dealers' Digest. Release No. 6806, supra note 7, at 78 n.12.
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estimating minimum levels of private placement activity 40 Recent growth
in the private placement market is more startling considering that reported
figures arguably represent the low end of the scale.
The United States private placement market, while not a new market, 4'
has increased substantially in importance in the 1980s. The total amount
of securities privately placed in the United States increased from $18
billion in 1981 to $139 billion in 1987, and to $202 billion in 1988.42
Additionally, the private placement market has broadened in the last
decade. Ten years ago, the largest fifteen institutional investors dominated
the market, but an informal survey of the fifteen largest players in the
private placement market in 1989 showed their total investment to account
for just one-fifth of the market. 43 This broadening of the market has

40. The definition is under-inclusive for several reasons: (1) it does not include securities
privately placed directly by the issuer, (2) bank loans, interest rates, and currency swaps are
excluded, (3) securities that a dealer buys for its own account are not included in the data,
(4) school issues, tax-exempt securities, sales of outstanding securities, privately placed secunties
purchased by foreign investors, and bridge loans are excluded, and (5) most privately placed
commercial paper is excluded. Release No. 6806, supra note 7, at 78 n.12.
The definition could be slightly over-inclusive as well. Drexel Burnham Lambert used a
technique of attaching registration rights to about 90% of the private placements it engineered.
These deals were structured so that they became registered, public securities in about one year.
At present, these deals are currently included in private placement totals generated by IDD
Information Services, Inc. Maher, Boom!, supra note 14, at 20.
41. See, e.g., A. COHAN, PRIVATE PLACEMENTS AND PUBLIC OFFERINGS: MARKET SHARES
SmICE 1935 (University of North Carolina School of Business Administration Technical Paper
No. 1, 1961).
42. Bensman, Shifting Boundaries: Moving the Line Between the Public and Private
Markets, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., Mar. 21, 1988, at 15, 19; Maher, Boom!, supra note
14, at 15; see also Release No. 6806, supra note 7, at 77-83 (Rule 144A proposing release
detailing private placement market characteristics).
43. Schwimmer, Biggest Buyers Upped Volume Slightly in '89, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG.,
Oct. 16, 1989, at 11. The following table reveals at a glance who the top players are in the
private placement market.
Largest Investors in Private Placements
($ millions)
Investor
Prudential

1989
(Estimated)
11,000

1988

% Purchased
Directly

10,000

50.0%

35,000

Total Portfolio
Size

Metropolitan

3,000

3,500

50.0%

24,000

Equitable

3,200

4,500

5.0%

13,000

2,800-2,900

2,400

7.0%

10,000

2,500

2,000

7.3%

9,000

Cigna
John Hancock
Aetna

2,000-2,500

1,700

20.0%

12,000-13,000

Travelers

2,200

1,700

10.0%1o

6,500

Teachers

2,200

1,850

15.0%

10,300
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resulted from, inter alia, such factors as the entry of pension fund managers
with substantial cash holdings into privately placed leveraged buyout (LBO)
debt that offers a significant premium above other available investments.4
Additionally, foreign and domestic commercial banks are increasingly competing for leveraged-leas& s deals and project financings."

Mass Mutual

1,750

1,300

10.0%

4,500

Principal Mutual

1,650

1,800

10.0%

5,700

MONY
Northwestern
New York Life

1,280-1,380

965

15.0%

4,500

1,200

1,000

20.0%

4,600

1,000-1,250

1,800

20.0%

7000-8,000

State of Wisconsin

600

650

22.6%

3,500

New England Mutual

500

500

5.0%

2,000

Id.
For a discussion of the composition of this field, including the entrance of pension funds
such as the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association ("Teachers"), see infra text at notes
147-57.
44. Premums on LBOs average 40% over the existing stock price. See S. KAPLAN,
MANAGEMENT "BuyouTs: EFCnINcY GAiNs OR VAL e TRANsFEs (Center for Research in
Security Prices, Graduate School of Business, Umversity of Chicago, Working Paper No. 244,
1988). The source of this increase in value is the subject of much debate and inquiry as
economists and legislators assess the social desirability of these corporate restructurings. See,
e.g., COPORATE FINANCuL STRucTuRus, supra note 31, at 58-63. The debate centers on
whether LBO prermums represent efficiency gains or are simply wealth transfers from one
corporate stakeholder to another. Id. Concerns over improper transfers target the following
likely beneficiaries: stockholders (at the sake of bondholders and/or employees) and management (at the sake of "outside" shareholders). Id., see also LBOs: Greed, Good Business-or
Both?, FoRTuNE, Jan. 2, 1989, at 66, 67 (Metropolitan Life and other bondholders of RJR
Nabisco sued management for damages based on the company's $5 billion of outstanding
bonds losing around 20% of value during their buyout battle involving the Kohlberg Kravis
and Roberts LBO firm).
45. A leveraged lease involves a lender in addition to the lessor and lessee. The lender,
usually a bank or insurance company, puts up a percentage-usually more than half-of the
cash required to purchase the asset. The balance is contributed by the lessor, who is both the
equity participant and the borrower. With this cash, the lessor acquires the asset, giving the
lender both a mortgage on the asset and an assignment of the lease and the lease payments.
The lessee then makes periodic payments to the lessor, who in turn pays the lender. As owner
of the asset, the lessor is entitled to tax deductions for depreciation on the asset and for
interest on the loan.
46. Schwimmer, supra note 43, at 11. Rule 144A, with its emphasis on institutional
investors, will fuel the debate over whether banking activities should be separate from securities
activities. Banks have become a large part of the private placement market, with three banks
among the top fifteen investors in private placements in 1989. Id. Since Rule 144A was
adopted, Citibank and others have become more active in the private placement market. Citi,
Other Banks Make Private PlacementPush By UnderwritingDeals, The Institutional Investor
Corp. Fin. Week, July 9, 1990 (LEXIS, Nexis library, Currnt file); Citibank Broadens Its
Hold on the Rule 144A ADR Market, PR Newswire, Aug. 30, 1990 (LEXIS, Nexis library,
Currnt file). Additionally, the recent credit crunch in the banking industry, combined with the
passage of Rule 144A, has caused a market shift from commercial bank financing to pnvate
placements, fueling the tension between the banking and securities industries. Goodwin, Private
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The composition of the private placement market, in addition to its sheer
size, is leading to a transformation of the capital markets. Private placements

Market Placements Up, ParticipantsSay, Am. Banker, July 25, 1990; at 1.
Although banking and securities law overlap in many respects, historical differences in
underlying philosophy create many ambiguities for regulators and the regulated:
Securities law is designed to protect investors. It is based on the premise of full
disclosure of both the activities of issuers of securities and enforcement actions
by the SEC. The purpose of full disclosure is to use the marketplace to assist in
regulation.
The history of banking regulation is far different. It has been premised on
protecting the financial system, not the shareholders. Consequently, the examination and enforcement actions of the bank regulators have been nonpublic.
With the increase in bank holding companies, their nonbanking activities, and
the broader activities of banks themselves, there has been increased conflict
between the different regulatory philosophies: the disclosure approach of the SEC
and the safety and soundness approach of the bank regulators.
E. SIMoNs & J. WHrTE, BANKING LAW 432-33 (2d ed. 1984).
The Glass-Steagall Act, which separated investment and commercial banking, is a prime
example of this conflict. Glass-Steagall is the popular name for four sections (16, 20, 21 and
32) of the Banking Act of 1933. See supra note 2. The four sections comprising Glass-Steagall
can be found, respectively, at 12 U.S.C. §§ 24, 377, 378, and 78 (1988). The Glass-Steagall
Act has been under criticism recently, with calls for repeal. E.g., The Financial Modernization
Act of 1988, S. 1886, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (repeal of Glass-Steagall necessary to strengthen
competition in the financial services industry); Legislative Proposals to Restructure Our
Financial System: Hearings on sec. 1886, sec. 1891, and sec. 1905 Before the Comm. on
Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1988). Most commentators argue
that the division of commercial and investment banking is no longer necessary, practical, or
desirable in the current financial marketplace. See Miles, Banking Affiliate Regulation Under
Section 23A of the FederalReserve Act, 105 BAN.ING L.J. 476 (1988) (concluding that should
Glass-Steagall be repealed, interaffiliate regulation of banks and securities affiliates could be
accomplished successfully through § 23A of the Federal Reserve Act, allowing the merger of
investment and commercial banking); Friedman & Friesen, A New Paradigm for Financial
Regulation: Getting From Here to There, 43 MD. L. R-v. 413 (1984); Longstreth, GlassSteagall: The Case for Repeal, 31 N.Y.L. SCH. L. Rav 281 (1986); Note, Restrictions on
Bank Underwriting of Corporate Securities: A Proposalfor More Permissive Regulations, 97
HARV L. Rav 720 (1984). But cf. Di Lorenzo, Public Confidence and the Banking System:
The Policy Basis for Continued Separation of Commercial and Investment Banking, 35 Am.
U.L. Ray 647 (1986) (arguing that policy-driven legislation must be evaluated as conditions
in the marketplace change); O'Brien, FinancialDeregulation: The Securities Industry Perspective, 31 N.Y.L. SCH. L. Rav 271 (1986).
The resolution of this debate will affect the impact of Rule 144A on the current financial
marketplace. At the present time, banks are actively participating in the private placement
market, but to do so they must jump through several hoops. For instance, the Federal Reserve
Board ("FRB") allows certain bank subsidianes-called § 20 non-bank banks after the statutory
provision of Glass-Steagall that has created this loophole-to participate in securities activities.
Maher, Private Market Changes May Not Be So Helpful to Commercial Banks, IvasmEsNTi
DEALaRs' Dio., Aug. 21, 1989, at 9, [hereinafter Maher, Private Market Changes]; see also
Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors of Fed. Reserve Sys., 900 F.2d 360 (D.C. Cir.
1990) -(upholding a FRB decision to permit § 20 subsidiaries to underwrite corporate equity
securities). Large commercial banks are now grappling with the issue of where to place their
private placement business: in the traditional commercial bank structure with their loan business
or in their § 20 subsidiaries. Maher, Private Market Changes, supra. Since § 20 includes an
underwriting limit of five percent of the subsidiary's revenue, many large banks will have an
incentive to move their private placement business (agented, fee-based businesses) into § 20
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once occupied only a debt market; however, the percentage of equity now

pnvately placed has grown to twelve percent of corporate financings in
1987. 47 This growth of privately placed equity, coupled with a trend toward

decreased initial public offenngs 4l and increased "going-private" transactions, 4 9 is significantly eroding the public's share of corporate ownership.

subsidiaries. Id. The FRB's interpretation of Glass-Steagall demands a wall of separation
between the commercial bank and the subsidiary (an "arms-length relationsip"), a demand
that is not m line with the reality of separating the private placement business from the very
similar loan business. Id. Recent developments are chipping away at the Glass-Steagall wall.
See Quint, Regulatory Shift Allows U.S. Banks to Trade Stocks, N.Y. Times, Sept. 21, 1990,
§ A, at 1, col. 6 (FRB effectively reversing major parts of Glass-Steagall by approving an
application by J.P Morgan and Co. to trade and sell corporate stocks).
Although the resolution of the Glass-Steagall issue will affect many of the issues discussed
herein, an in-depth analysis of the debate over whether bank securities activities should be
restricted, and to what extent, is beyond the scope of this Note. For the SEC's response to
this issue, see SEC Reauthonzation: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications
and Finance of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 252-54
(1989) (response of David S. Ruder, Chairman of the SEC, to a post-heanng question on
Rule 144A and Glass-Steagall by Congressman Leland) [hereinafter SEC Reauthorization]. The
author agrees with the SEC's interpretation that it would be preferable to restructure the
existing regulations to regulate securities and banking activities by function, not by whether
they are state or federal entities or whether they are techically labeled a bank activity or a
securities activity. See also Cane, Non-Broker Brokers and Other Anomalies in the Regulation
of FinancialServices, 11 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1l1, 175 (1988) (noting how absurd it is
that our regulatory system has generated non-bank banks and non-broker brokers and calling
for regulation "by function and not institutionla type").
The SEC is the obvious choice to oversee the function of securities activities. The overall
protection of investors, and of the financial marketplace in general, is much more likely to
be accomplished through this approach than through further segmentation when market forces
are moving in just the opposite direction-consolidation of financial services to improve
competition in global markets. The SEC has proven itself to be a capable regulator of the
securities industry, regardless of where those securities activities are actually conducted. Recent
events in the banking industry call for a revised approach to regulation. Clothed in the name
of opportunity for innovation, deference to state powers resulted in a savings and loan fiasco
that ultimately fell on the federal government to resolve. See FinancialInstitutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989-(H.R. 1278): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
FinancialInstitutionsSupervision, Regulation and Insuranceof the House Comm. on Banking,
Finance and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. (1989) (two-part series exploring Public

Law No. 101-73, known by its acronym "FIRREA" and sigued into law by President Bush
on August 9, 1989). Because of this law's length, complexity, and recentness, not much
literature analyzing the law's effect on financial institutions has yet emerged. However, in an
outline prepared for a recent conference attended by the author, one expert said that the law
"will forever change the complexion and configuration of the U.S. financial institutions
industry, probably resulting in massive consolidations." Kneipper, The Changing Shape of
FinancialServices: New Directionsfor FinancialInstitutionsAfter FIRREA, reprinted in PLI
21st Annual Securities Institute Course Materials 105, 109 (1989).
47. Maher, What is the SEC Stirring Up?, INVESmaENT DEAimS' Dia., Feb. 20, 1989, at
17, 20 [hereinafter Maher, SEC]; Release No. 6806, supra note 7, at 79.
48. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 101ST CONG., IsT SEss., CORP. FIN. TRENDS 1989:
A REPORT FOR THE SUBCOMM. ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND FINANCE OF THE HousE CoMM.
ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE 6-8 (Comm. Print 1989).
49. Id. at 20-24; Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARv. Bus. REv., Sept.-Oct.
1989, at 61, 62-66 [hereinafter Jensen, Eclipse]; cf. C. Muscarella & M. Vetsuypens, Efficiency
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One leading economist, Michael Jensen, has termed this phenomenon the
"eclipse of the public corporation." 50 Jensen, labelled by Lowenstein as the
"apostle of each 'new era' in finance, ' 5' applauds these changes as a
necessary evolution in corporate financial structure and characterizes the
resulting firms as more efficient than the public corporation.5 2 Other commentators are less optimistic about the change and worry about the erosion
of the public corporation-the hallmark of the Umted States capitalist
system.13 With the demise of the public corporation, Jensen's critics see a
loss of public confidence in the economy, a loss of informational access, a
loss of monitoring safeguards, and a corresponding loss of efficiency.5 4 Part
III of this Note analyzes the merits of this debate-a debate that reflects
fundamental tensions driving corporate governance theory-and predicts the
role that Rule 144A and the increased institutionalization and pnvatization
of the markets will play in its resolution.

II.
A.

RuLE 144A

Regulatory Framework and Normative Underpinnings

Rule 144A is almost certain to propel the trends of increasing institutionalization and use of private financing that are already underway in the
market.55 However, before assessing the Rule's impact and its macroeconomic consequences, 5 6 it is necessary to understand the statutory context in
which Rule 144A operates and to explore the policy behind that legal
structure.57 Several interconnected themes run through the federal securities

and Organizational Structure: A Study of Reverse LBOs (unpublished working paper, Southern
Methodist University, 1989) (copy on file with the Indiana Law Journal) (examining the large
wealth gains shareholders acquire when companies that have been taken private go public
again, usually within three years).
50. Jensen, Eclipse, supra note 49, at 61.
51. Letter from Louis Lowenstein, Simon H. Rifkind Professor of Law, Columbia University, to the editor of the HarvardBusiness Review, HARv Bus. Rav., Nov.-Dec. 1989, at
182 (responding to Jensen's article, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, supra note 49).
52. Jensen, Eclipse, supra note 49, at 61-62.
53. Letters to the editor of the Harvard Business Review, HARv Bus. REv., Nov.-Dec.
1989, at 182-208 (responding to Jensen's article, Eclipse of the Public Corporation,supra note
49).
54. See infra notes 174-96 and accompanying text for a further discussion of this issue.
55. See infra text at notes 141-57.
56. See infra text at notes 158-97
57. Arguing, or measuring, the efficiency or acceptability of alternatives without reference
to normative justifications is a shallow enterprise. For an interesting article that explores the
deficiencies of argument without normative discourse, see Leff, Economic Analysis of Law:
Some Realism About Nominalism, 60 VA. L. Rav 451 (1974) (a commentary on Richard
Posner's book, ECONomic ANALYsis op LAW (1973)). Although Leff's article offers many
substantial insights, one theme is the need for discourse on the normative aspirations of the
law. Leff criticizes Posner for denying that his descriptive statements about the law have
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laws' regulatory framework: privileging disclosure over merit as a standard
of review, limiting the scope of regulation to public distributions rather
than private sales, and distinguishing between regulation of prinary distnbutions (focus of the 1933 Act) and trading of securities in the secondary
market (focus of the 1934 Exchange Act). 58

1. The Disclosure Philosophy
Rule 144A is an addition to the Securities Act of 1933. 59 President
Roosevelt, in his message to Congress on March 29, 1933, outlined what
would become the underlying philosophy of the Act:
Of course, the Federal Government cannot and should not take any
action which might be construed as approving or guaranteeing that newly
issued securities are sound in the sense that their value will be maintained
or that the properties which they represent will earn profit.
There is, however, an obligation upon us to insist that every issue of
new securities to be sold in interstate commerce shall be accompanied
by full publicity and information, and that no essentially important
element attending the issue shall be concealed from the buying public.60

normative overtones. In his conclusion, Leff writes:
There is [no conclusion], and that's the point. We all know that all value is
not a sole function of willingness to pay, and that it's a grievous mistake to use
a tone which implies (while the words deny) that it is. Man may be the measure
of all things, but he is not beyond measurement himself. I don't know how one
talks about it, but napalming babies is bad, and so is letting them or even their
culpable parents starve, freeze, or merely suffer plain miserable discomfort while
other people, more "valuable" than they are or not, freely choose snowmobiles
and whipped cream. Whatever is wrong with all that, it is only partly statistical.
People are neither above reproach, nor are they ever just "sunk costs." And
"the law" has always known it; that is the source of its tension and complexity.
If economic efficiency is part of the common law (and it is), so is fiat justitia,
ruat coelum [roughly, let justice be done though the heavens may fall].
Leff, supra, at 481 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original); cf. R. PosEi & K. ScoTT,
EcoNoMIcs OF CoRPoRATioN LAW AND SEcuarriEs REGULATION (1980) (extending general theory
of economic analysis of law to corporate and securities fields).
Leff's comments apply with equal force to the law of corporate governance and finance.
Not all laws can be measured by their effect on the market. Whether LBOs are efficient may
be an entirely different question to academics or Wall Street's investment bankers than to the
employees losing their jobs or the community losing the business entity that has become
entrenched in the local culture. This Note adopts the premise that the most effective use of
corporate law is to mediate between the various corporate constituencies (i.e., shareholders,
management, employees, creditors, suppliers, etc.) rather than to design rigid rules that per se
elevate one interest over another. See infra text at notes 181-97. This Note saves for future
inquiry whether the modem public corporation is the proper entity to withstand and to promote
such mediation.
58. See L. Loss & J. SEUmoAN, SEcuRITIEs REGULATION 171-224 (1989) (interesting section

entitled "The Battle of the Philosophies").
59. See supra note 2 (discussing the Securities Act).
60. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1933). Louis Brandeis was also instrumental
in establishing the disclosure philosophy of the Act. See L. BRANDEis, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY
62-73 (1914).
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Simply stated, the Securities Act adopts a disclosure, as opposed to a merit,
standard of review 61 Section 562 of the Act implements the Act's focus on
disclosure in public offerings by requiring anyone who offers or sells a
security to comply with the SEC's registration provisions unless a valid
exemption 63 from registration is available. The exemptions relevant for the
purposes of analyzing Rule 144A are the section 4(1) 64 trading exemption
and the section 4(2)65 private placement exemption. The procedure contemplated by section 5 requires that a registration statement (including a
disclosure document called a "prospectus") 66 be filed with the SEC. 67 The
SEC staff then reviews the filing materials for deficiencies while often
corresponding with the registrant by letter to point out shortcomings in the
disclosure documents. 68 The registration statement may become effective by

61. Some blue sky (state) securities statutes do provide for merit review by the state
securities commissions. See, e.g., Braisted, Merit Regulation in BLUE SKY LAWS 1989 (PLI
Course Handbook Series, No. 654).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1988).
63. Exemptions from the registration provisions of the Act are contained in § 3 and § 4.
15 U.S.C. § 77c, 77d (1988). See generally J.W HICKS, EX MMPD TRANsAcTIoNs UNDER TE
SEcuRrrms ACT OF 1933 (rev. ed. 1988). For Rule 144A's relation to the theory of exempting
transactions under the Act, see infra text accompanying notes 75-92.
64. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(i) (1988).
65. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (1988).
66. "Registration statement" is defined in § 2(8). 15 U.S.C. § 77b(8) (1988). "Prospectus"
is defined in § 2(10). 15 U.S.C. § 77b(10) (1988).
67 Section 6 of the Act contains the procedure for filing a registration statement. 15
U.S.C. § 77f (1988). For an excellent discussion of the SEC's registration procedure, see L.
Loss & J. SELIoMAN, supra note 58, at 513-95.
The SEC is in the process of implementing an electronic filing system it calls "EDGAR"
(acronym for Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis and Retrieval) to improve the processing
and dissemination of the over seven million pages of documents filed with the Commission
each year. Id. at 586. The securities bar seems frustrated that EDGAR has not yet been fully
implemented. During the 21st Annual Institute on Securities Regulation held November 2-4,
1989 in New York City, which this author attended, representatives of the SEC were questioned
on the status of EDGAR during a panel discussion. The question drew loud applause from
the audience but little response from the SEC.
68. See 17 C.F.R. § 202.3(a) (1990) (detailing the Commission's procedure for processing
filings, including registration statements). In pertinent part, § 202.3(a) states:
If the filing appears to afford inadequate disclosure, as for example through
ormission of material information or through violation of accepted accounting
principles and practices, the usual practice is to bring the deficiency to the
attention of the person who filed the document by letter
and to afford a
reasonable opportunity to discuss the matter and make the necessary corrections.
Id. Section 202.3(a) also discusses the circumstances under which the Commission may dispense
with the informal comment procedure in favor of adimmstrative remedies: "This informal
procedure is not generally employed when the deficiencies appear to stem from careless
disregard of the statutes and rules or a deliberate attempt to conceal or nuslead or where the
Commission deems formal proceedings necessary in the public interest." Id.
For an overview of the Commssion's review procedure, see L. Loss & J. SELI~mAN, supra
note 58, at 521-32. The Commssion's announcement of the "selective review" system was
made in 1980. See Commission to Implement Changes to Reduce Delays in Processing of
Registration Statements, Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 579, at A-14, A-15 (Nov. 19, 1980).
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SEC declaration or by passage of time. 69 An effective registration statement
means that the registrant may lawfully offer and sell securities to the public
under the document. A copy of the prospectus must be given to each
investor prior to the sale, or in some cases, when- the security is delivered
70
after the sale.

2.

The Distribution/Trading Distinction

Not all securities and transactions fall within section 5's registration net.
Securities law makes a baseline distinction between distributions of securities
and trading of securities. This distinction reflects two separate markets: the
primary market, in which business entities distribute securities to raise

capital, and the secondary market, in which the certificates representing
that capital infusion are traded among market participants. The Securities
Act prohibits distributions from occurring without the Act's disclosure
safeguards (or a valid exemption from registration). 7' Trading, provided it
is free of fraud, is relatively unconstrained. This freedom allows what
William J. Baumol has called "an act of magic" to occur:
[I]t permits long-term investments to be financed by funds provided
by individuals, many of whom wish to make them available for only a
very limited penod, or who wish to be able to withdraw them at will.
Thus it
[transforms] "what are short-term credits from the private
viewpoint into long-term savings from the social viewpoint
to the
fullest extent." 72
The stock market provides investors with liquidity, 73 but at the same time,
it provides corporations with a steady pool of capital. The market performs

In fiscal years 1986-87 and 1987-88, the Commission met its goal of reviewing all initial public
offerings, going pnvate transactions, third party tender offers, proxy contests, and new
securities and novel financing techniques. SEC Reauthorization,supra note 46, at 78 (written
response of Chairman David S. Ruder to questions posed by Representative Edward J. Markey).
69. Section 8 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77h (1988), details the procedure by which a
registration statement may become effective, including provisions for amendments thereto.
70. The prospectus-delivery requirements are derived from the interplay between § 5 and
§ 4(3) of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 77e, 77d(3) (1988). See L. Loss, FUNDAMNTAts OF SacUTrriEs
REGULATION 90-92, 116-18 (1988). In considering the interaction of the 1933 Act and the 1934
Act, see infra text accompanying note 197, it is important to note Rule 174, 17 C.F.R. §
230.174 (1990), which waives the statutory waiting periods of § 4(3) if the issuer is a reporting
company.
71. 15 U.S.C. § 77(e). See supra notes 59-70 and accompanying text.
72. W.J. BAUMOL, TaE STOCK MARKET AND EcoNoMc EFcIIENcY 3-4 (1965), quoted in
L. LOWENSTIN, supra note 20, at 91.

73. Liquidity is the subject of much inquiry in legal and economic literature. Even a precise
definition of liquidity is debated. See J. KEYNEs, THE GENER.

THEoRY OF EMPLOYMENT,

MONEY 240 (1953) ("The conception of what contributes to 'liquidity' is a partly
vague one, changing from time to time and depending on social practices and institutions.");
Lippman & McCall, An OperationalMeasure of Liquidity, 76 AM. ECON. REv 43, 48 (1986).
INTEREST AND
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tis magic free from the enormous transaction costs that would be- involved
if the corporation dealt with the millions of investors on an individual basis.
3.

Rule 144A Transactions

At one end of the regulatory spectrum is the individual selling a few
shares of registered stock through a local broker. This transaction is exempt
under the section 4(1) 74 general trading exemption. At the other extreme is
a multinational corporation, assisted by Wall Street's investment bankers
and a network of broker-dealers, distributing five million shares of common
stock in an initial public offering. 75 This transaction is always subject to
section 5'S76 registration requirements, b.ecause it is the goal of the Act to
ensure that a public distribution is accompanied by enough information
about the issuer to enable the investor to make an informed investment

decision. Between those extremes is the private placement that is exempt
from section 5 by section 4(2).77 This would entail, for instance, an offering
of subordinated debentures 7 to an insurance company or other institution.

Two scholars capture this definitional problem as follows:
Keynes once observed that while most of us could surely agree that Queen
Victoria was a happier woman, but a less sticcessful monarch than Queen
Elizabeth I, we would be hard put to restate that notion in precise mathematical
terms. Keynes' observation could apply with equal force to the notion of market
liquidity. The T bond Futures pit at the Chicago Board of Trade is surely more
liquid than the local market for residential housing. But how much more? What
is the decisive difference between them? Is the colorful open-outcry format of
the T-bond Futures market the source of its great liquidity 9 Or does the causation
run the other way 9
S. GRossMAN & M. MILLER, LiQuiDrrY Aim MARrET STRucTtur
2 (National Bureau of
Economic Research Working Paper No. 2641, 1988).
For a comprehensive discussion of liquidity, including the separate components of time-risk,
market-risk, and valuation-risk liquidity in the context of developing a liquidity-based standard
for justifying double-taxation of business entities, see Rudmck, Who Should Pay the Corporate
Tax in a Flat Tax World?, 39 CASE W REs. L. REv 965 (1988-1989).
Liquidity is important to institutions for several reasons. For example, a high level of
liquidity allows the trading of large blocks of stock without adversely affecting the market.
Also, many institutions have liquidity requirements statutorily or contractually imposed to
ensure that sufficient cash (or quasi-cash) reserves are available to cover demands. Further,
an instrument with high liquidity will carry a lower rate of return than will a less liquid
instrument.
74. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1).
75. The stock issued might also be a more complex instrument than common stock such
as a hybrid security (containing features of both debt and equity). Issues of securities are
becoming increasingly complex. For information on what types of securities and attributes
(such as conversion features, warrants, and exchange rights) mean to investors, see V BRUrNz'Y
& M. C=mELsTiN, CORPORATE FINANCE (1987), and R. WILsoN, CoAmTE SENIOR SECUtnIES
(1987).
76. 15 U.S.C. § 77e.
77 15 U.S.C. §.77d(2).
78. A subordinated debenture is a debt instrument "that has a claim on the issuing firm's
assets that is jumor to other forms of debt." BLACK'S LAw DICTONARY 1426 (6th ed. 1990).
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As one drafter of the Act said: "The sale of an issue of securities to
insurance companies or to a limited group of experienced investors,
was
79
certainly not a matter of concern to the federal government.1

Still, such pnvately-placed securities are labeled restricted securities80 and
are not freely tradeable as are securities acquired in a public offering.
Determng whether the resale of restricted securities is more like ordinary
trading, or like a distribution that needs the Act's protection, is the question
to which Rule 144A is addressed.
The existing regulatory framework does not provide an answer. Section
4(2) offers an exemption for "transactions by an issuer not involving any
public offering." 8' However, an institutional investor, or anyone seeking to
resell securities, is not the issuer of the stock. Also, while section 4(1)'s
trading exemption-"transactions by any person other than an issuer,

underwriter, or dealer" 82-seems like a possibility on its face, the term
underwriter83 is defined so broadly that it tangles institutions selling blocks
of stock in its web. The resale of restricted stock in a private placement
does not fit squarely into either the section 4(1) trading exemption or the

section 4(2) private sale exemption, although it contains characteristics of
both. This transaction, however, has been judicially" and admimstratively85

79. Landis, supra note 11, at 37.
80. Restncted securities are securities acquired in a private placement or securities held by
an affiliate of the issuer. Conversely, securities acquired in a valid public offering are not
restricted and may be freely resold, as long as the investor is not an affiliate of the issuer.
See 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1990). This concept demonstrates the transactional nature of the
Securities Act. See Hicks, The Concept of Transaction as a Restraint on Resale Limitations,
49 Omo ST. L.J. 417 (1988). Other than a few limited provisions that actually exempt a
security from the requirements of registration, an exemption is only good for the particular
transaction. Id. at 423 n.38. An issuer's exemption does not carry over to the purchaser. The
purchaser must find a separate exemption from the registration requirements of the Act. Id.
at 428-31.
81. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2) (emphasis added).
82. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(1).
83. Section 2(11) states:
The term "underwriter" means any person who has purchased from an issuer
with a view to, or offers or sells for an issuer in connection with, the distribution
of any security, or participates or has a direct or indirect participation in any
such undertaking, or participates or has a participation in the direct or indirect
underwriting of any such undertaking; but such term shall not include a person
whose interest is limited to a commission from an underwriter or dealer not in
excess of the usual and customary distributors' or sellers' commission. As used
in this paragraph the term "issuer" shall include, in addition to an issuer, any
person directly or indirectly controlling or controlled by the issuer, or any person
under direct or indirect common control with the issuer.
15 U.S.C. § 77b(11) (1988).
84. E.g., Value Line Fund, Inc. v. Marcus, [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 91,523 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1965).
85. Employee Benefit Plans, Securities Act Release No. 6188, 45 Fed. Reg. 8960, 8977
n.178 (Feb. 11, 1980); see also Candela Laser Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, [1987-1988
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,530, at 77,728 (Sept. 28, 1987) (acknowledging
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found to be within the overall purpose of the Act and thus has been

exempted from registration requirements in many contexts. Indeed, this
exemption has become known as the section 4(1-1/2) exemption, 6 although
it has never been officially sanctioned by the SEC.17 In order to protect
themselves from liability for violating the Act, issuers, counsel, and buyers
have to carefully construct each transaction under this phantom exemption.
This is a time consuming, costly process, but the alternative is either potential
liability 8 or resorting to the existing safe harbor of Rule 14481 that mandates

a two-year holding period before resales can be effected free from potential
liability
Rule 144's holding period is the SEC's method of determining that the
securities were held for "investment" rather than for "distribution.' '9
However, the holding period substantially reduces the liquidity of the
securities, causing investors to demand a liquidity-premum 9 for purchasing

the existence of § 4(1-1/2) exemption). Although the Commission's staff does issue no-action
letters touching on § 4(1-1/2) exemption issues, it has formally declared that it will not express
views on this general area. Procedures Utilized by the Division of Corporate Finance for
Rendenng Informal Advice, Securities Act Release No. 6253, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,644 (Nov. 3,
1980).
86. See Schneider, Section 4(1-1/2)--PrvateResales of Restricted or Control Securities, 49
OMo ST. L.J. 501 (1988); Olander & Jacks, The Section 4(1-1/2) Exemption-Reading Between
the Lines of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 SEC. REo. L.J. 339 (1988); The Section "4(1-1/
2)" Phenomenon: Private Resales of "'Restricted" Securities, 34 Bus. LAw 1961 (1979);
Comment, Reinterpreting the "Section 4(1-1/2)" Exemption from Securities Registration: The
Investor Protection Requirement, 16 U.S.F L. REv 681 (1982).
87 The SEC has commented on the need to address the uncertainty surrounding the §
4(1-1/2) exemption on several occasions. For example, Linda C. Quinn, Director of the
Division of Corporate Finance, delivered an address to an ABA committee entitled: "Redefining
'Public Offering or Distribution' for Today," in which she called the § 4(1-1/2) exemption a
"phantom" exemption. Schneider, supra note 86, at 505 n.25.
88. Failure to comply with federal restraints on the resale of securities may result in
administrative sanctions and/or a private action for damages by the purchaser of the securities
under § 12(1) of the Act. 15 U.S.C. § 771(1) (1988). Section 12(i) is a strict liability provision,
as a plaintiff does not have to prove scienter on the part of the defendant. See J.W HICKS,
Ci-LaLA3nrrls: ENFORCEMENT AND LITIGATION UNDER TIM SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 (1989)
(two additional volumes forthcoming).
89. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144. Rule 144 was promulgated as a non-exclusive safe harbor from
resale uncertainties for holders of restricted or control securities. Securities Act Release No.
5223, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,487 (Jan. 11, 1972) [hereinafter
Release No. 5223]. Rule 144 indicates that it is to be used for the resale of securities exempt
from "section 4 of the Act," but does not specify what subsection of section 4 is contemplated.
17 C.F.R. § 230.144(e)(3)(vii). For background on this ambiguity, see Schneider, supra note
86, at 505 n.26.
90. Underlying this holding period requirement is the assumption that the purchaser of the
securities ought to be "at risk" for a reasonable period of time before selling the securities
without registration, thereby implying a bona fide ownership interest. Release No. 5223, supra
note 89, at 81,056.
91. For a discussion of liquidity, see supra note 73. When considering liquidity premiums,
it is important that if an investor receives a discount for lack of liquidity, then she has been
compensated for any restraint on resale to avoid double counting.
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them instead of non-restricted securities, which then raises the cost of capital

to the issuer. This is an unreasonable price to pay when the nature of the
transaction indicates that it was never intended to be within the Act's scope.
So began the pleas to the SEC to loosen the reigns on resale restrictions

which culminated in Rule 144A, allowing sophisticated investors to fend for
themselves in the market. 92

B.

Technical Operation of Rule 144A

Rule 144A addresses the confusion surrounding the section 4(1-1/2)
exemption93 by explicitly exempting certain resales of restricted securities
from the registration provisions of the Securities Act. 94 The section

4(1-1/2) exemption was most clearly authorized when the resale of restricted
securities was made to a party able to "fend for itself" in the marketplace

and was done in a private transaction not involving the dangers attendant
upon a public offering. 9 It is precisely this situation that Rule 144A
addresses. The SEC creates in essence a block exemption 96 by providing a
nonexclusive safe harbor 97 from the registration requirements of the Act 9

92. See supra note 7 for the history of the Rule 144A proposal.
93. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
94. 15 U.S.C. § 77(e).
95. For an insightful analysis of judicial development of doctnne to address the resale of
restricted securities, see Hicks, supra note 80.
96. I use "block exemption" to refer to an exemption based on a recurring fact pattern
which has become so frequently requested and consistently granted, that it is administratively
more convenient to carve it out of the regulatory net than to deal with each set of facts
separately. The European Economic Community (EEC) uses this technique in its antitrust law.
Article 85(3) of the Treaty of Rome allows the Commission, with the authorization of the
Council, to issue "block exemptions" that specify general classes of agreements for which an
individual application for exemption from antitrust law is not required. See B. HAwK, UNITED
STATES,

COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL ANTITRUST:

A

CoMPARATIvE

GUIDE

(2d ed.

1985).
97. The phrase "nonexclusive safe harbor" is used in securities law parlance to mean that
the failure to fully comply with the particular safe harbor rule does not preclude reliance on
another exemption that may be applicable. The following example can serve as an illustration
of this principle in the context of Rule 144A. Consider the resale by a very large insurance
company such as Prudential of $2 million of a class of unlisted IBM preferred stock to another
insurance company of medium size. Consider further that Prudential wants to sell this stock
m reliance on Rule 144A. Prudential makes the sale, but its counsel neglects to verify that the
buyer is a "qualified institutional buyer" as defined m Rule 144A. Rule 144A requires a
"qualified institutional buyer" to have a minimum of $100 million invested in securities. The
facts reveal that the buyer had $75 million invested in securities at the close of its most recent
fiscal year and therefore did not qualify under Rule 144A's $100 million limit. Although the
"safe harbor" of Rule 144A is not met for Prudential, it can still rely on another resale
exemption from the Act, such as the § 4(1-1/2) theory or *the options available in Rule 144 if
applicable. Provided another exemption is available to Prudential, there will be no risk of
liability for the failure to comply with Rule 144A since it is nonexclusive.
Regulation D, a safe harbor for § 4(2) of the Act, works in a similar format. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 77d(2) (the section 4(2) private placement exemption); 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-230.508 (1990)
(Regulation D).
98. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A, preliminary notes 1, 2.
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for resales of restricted securities to "qualified institutional buyers" as
defined in the Rule. 99 The operation of Rule 144A turns on three factors:

eligible purchasers, eligible securities, and information requirements.
1.

Eligible Purchasers

Although the onginal proposal1 ° contained three tiers 01 of transactions
that would have been eligible for the safe harbor, the final Rule adopted

only a modified version of the first tier-"qualified institutional buyers."'0 2
Rule 144A creates a presumption, based on the dollar amount the institution
has invested in securities, that an institution falling within its definition of
"qualified institutional buyer" is sophisticated-a presumption that the
investor has enough experience in the private resale market for restricted

securities to be able to fend for itself. 103 To qualify as an eligible purchaser,
institutions generally must own and invest, on a discretionary basis, at least
$100 million in securities of issuers not affiliated with the entity. 1 4 This

99. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(a)(1) defines the term qualified institutional buyer. See infra
notes 101-08 and accompanying text.
100. Release No. 6806, supra note 7, at 93-99.
i01.
The three tiers of the original proposal were: (1) the qualified institutional buyer tier,
(2) the non-fungible securities tier, and (3) the fungible securities tier. The first tier permitted
unlimited resales of any security of any issuer as long as the buyer met the definition of a
qualified institution. The second tier allowed unlimited resales of securities to a wider class of
specified institutions as long as the securities were not fungible with a class listed on a national
securities exchange or quoted in an inter-dealer quotation system (NASDAQ) and were nonconvertible debt securities, non-convertible preferred stock, or securities issued by a company
subject to a continuous reporting obligation under the Exchange Act. The third tier covered
resales of non-convertible debt secunties, non-convertible preferred stock, and securities of
reporting compames that are traded in a public market in the United States to the same class
of institutions that are specified in the second tier. Release No. 6806, supra note 7, at 76-77,
93-99.
102. It is interesting that the SEC elected to use the term "buyer" rather than "investor."
For cnticism of buying and selling versus investing, see L. LowaNsTEn, supra note 20.
103. In the proposing release, the SEC stated:
In defining a "qualified institutional buyer," the Commission has attempted to
establish a level at which it can be confident that participating investors have
extensive experience in the private resale market for restricted securities. In
addition, the Commission is seeking to identify a class of investors that can be
conclusively assumed to be sophisticated and in little need of the protection
afforded by the Securities Act's registration provisions.
Release No. 6806, supra note 7, at 94.
104. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(a)(1)(i). A dealer registered under § 15 of the Exchange Act
must own and invest, on a discretionary basis, $10 million in securities, rather than $100
million. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(a)(1)(ii). A broker acting as a riskless principal on behalf of a
qualified institutional buyer is also deemed a qualified institutional buyer. 17 C.F.R. §
230.144A(a)(l)(iii). The lowering of the broker-dealer threshold is a significant change from
the Rule as originally proposed, but arguably is justified because the development of the Rule
144A market will largely hinge on the existence of dealers willing and qualified to make a
market in Rule 144A securities.
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"investments in securities" standard is in contrast to the $100 million total
asset limit contained in the original proposal of Rule 144A.105 It is likely
that the SEC made this change in order to limit the number of eligible

purchasers, especially the number of troubled banks and thrifts eligible to
participate.' °0 Although much debate centered on how to determine whether
an institution was per se sophisticated,' °0 the "investment in securities" test
is likely to be more successful in assessing investor sophistication than an

asset standard. 08

2.

Eligible Securities

Rule 144A is not available for securities that, when issued, were of the
same class as securities listed on a national securities exchange or quoted

in the National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotation
(NASDAQ) system.' 9 The functional reality of this limitation is to exclude
common stock from the Rule's protection and to relegate Rule 144A's use

to non-convertible debt and non-convertible preferred stock." 0 As originally
proposed, Rule 144A did not contain this limitation; it was added in response

to critics' assertions that side-by-side public and private markets would
develop for the same class of an issuer's securities."' However, this concern
may have been driven by critics' pocket book
seems unlikely to mature and
2
reactions to the new Rule."1

105. Release No. 6806, supra note 7, at 94.
106. The SEC confirmed tis argument upon final adoption of Rule 144A by adding a
second check on banks' qualification under the Rule. In addition to the $100 million "investments in securities" test, a bank or savings and loan must also have an audited net worth of
at least $25 million as demonstrated in its latest annual financial statements. 17 C.F.R. §
230.144A(a)(1)(vi). The number of institutions that would have been eligible under the asset
standard was considerably igher than the number of institutions eligible under the invested
securities standard. See Release No. 6839, supra note 7, at 2032.
107. See Comment Letters received from industry participants m response to proposed Rule
144A, SEC File No. S7-23-88 (1989) (available for photocopying in the SEC's public reference
room in Washington, D.C.) (copy on file with the IndianaLaw Journal) [hereinafter Comment
Letters].
108. Release No. 6806, supra note 7, at 95-96. SEC data indicates that this presumption is
reasonable, in part, because entities of this size (and smaller) employ investment analysts to
handle their securities portfolios. Id.
109. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(d)(3)(i). This qualification does not encompass the over-thecounter market (OTC), also known as the "pink sheets." Both convertible or exchangeable
securities, with a conversion premum of less than 10% and warrants that may be exercised
within three years from the date of issuance or that have an exercise premium of less than
10%, are treated as securities of the class into which they are convertible, exchangeable or
exercisable. Id.
110. H. BLOOMENTRAL, supra note 14, at 8-23 to 8-24.
ill. See Release No. 6839, supra note 7, at 2035; Comment Letters, supra note 107.
112. Criticism and support of Rule 144A emerged in factions clustered around Rule 144A's
perceived effect on the commentators' current business. See, e.g., Levin, NYSE Still Has
Misgivings About SEC Planfor Private Placements, INEsTmmr DAT Rs' Di., Oct. 2, 1989,
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Information Requirements

Rule 144A uses the reporting requirements of the Exchange Act"' to
determine when a seller in a Rule 144A transaction must provide information
to the buyer about the issuer of the securities, and when there is sufficient
publicly available information that this is not necessary Where the issuer
is a reporting company under the Exchange Act, the holder wishing to resell
securities under Rule 144A has no duty to provide the buyer with any
information about the issuer of the securities." 4 Also, if the issuer is a
foreign private issuer exempt from the reporting requirements of the Exchange Act through Rule 12g3-2(b), 1s which mandates that the foreign

at 8, 9 ("The exchange stands to be hurt if a substantial new market for equities develops
outside the exchange, because it would depnve the Big Board and others of some business.");
Maher, SIA Drafts Letter Opposing Private Market Expansion, INvESmMNT DE:AERS' DiG.,
Jan. 23, 1989, at 6 ("The SIA [Securities Industry Association] letter is prompted by a general
fear in Street firms that the proposed rule will hurt their underwriting and securities trading
business

").

113. The reporting requirements of the Exchange Act are contained in §§ 12(g), 13(a), and
15(d). 15 U.S.C. §§ 781(g), 78in(a), 78o(g) (1988). Reporting requirements involve factors such
as the number of beneficial owners in companies with securities traded over the counter (12(g)),
whether the issuer has filed a registration statement under the 1933 Act (15(d)), and whether
the issuer has stock listed on a national securities exchange (13(a)). As of September 30, 1989,
there were 18,090 companies required to file annual reports with the SEC. SEcUrrITES AND
EXCHANGE CoImISSION, DIRECTORY OF COMPANIES REQUIRED TO FILE ANNUAL

REPORTS wiTH

1934,
at I (Sept. 30, 1989) (companies listed alphabetically and by industry group).
114. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(d)(4)(i).
115. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(b) (1990). Under this rule, the securities of over 1,400 foreign
issuers are traded in the United States. These issuers are exempt from the reporting requirement
of the Exchange Act if they do not make a public offering in the United States or are listed
on a national exchange or quoted in NASDAQ, and they make available to the Commission
the information required to be public in their home country. This provision was promulgated
to recognize that foreign issuers have difficulty complying with the United States specifications
for disclosure, principally because foreign countries do not adhere to GAAP (Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles) standards, but instead use their own accounting standards.
SEC Reauthorization, supra note 46, at 92 (1989). See generally PRACTSiNG LAW INSTITTE,
ACCOUNTING FOR LA YERs (1989) (includes a chapter (26) on sources of GAAP).
Most of these foreign securities are traded as American Depositary Shares (ADSs). An ADS
is evidenced by a certificate called an Amencan Depositary Receipt or ADR. The ADR entitles
the holder to receive securities of a specified foreign issuer upon presentation of the ADR to
the depositary institution. ADSs were developed to resolve problems such as dividends payable
in foreign currencies and foreign clearance practices. The investor wishing to trade in foreign
securities can deal directly with a local depository institution in local currency, making the
process less burdensome to the investor. SEC Reauthorization, supra note 46, at 92; see also
M. ToRostAN, SEcuRuIs TRANSFER: PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURES (rev. 4th ed. 1988) (comprehensive and readable text on basic procedure of securities transfer).
The Commission keeps the financial community informed as to what foreign companies are
exempt under rule 12g3-2(b) by publishing periodic lists of those companies. In this way,
brokers and other intermediaries, as well as investors, can have an accessible reference of
foreign companies that have public information on file with the Commission. For a recent
listing, see Securities Exchange Act Release No. 27,325, 44 SEC Docket 1195 (CCH) (Sept.
29, 1989).
THE SEcuRniES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION UNDER TH

SEcurrims ExCHiANGE ACT OF
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issuer provide certain information to the SEC in order to maintain the
exemption, then the seller incurs no further disclosure obligation to the
buyer.11 6 The SEC"I and commentators" 8 believed that the publicly available
information on the issuer should be sufficient to protect the buyer.
However, if the securities are issued by a company not subject to the
reporting requirements of the Exchange Act or exempt under Rule
12g3-2(b),"19 then the seller is required to provide to the buyer, upon request,
basic information concerning the business of the issuer and its financial
statements.'12 The Commission constructed these information requirements in
response to concerns raised over the availability of information on the issuer
of the securities being resold.' 2 ' This distinction between reporting and
nonreporting issuers comports with the underlying philosophy of the securities laws-disclosure-and strikes what is likely to be in practice a reasonable compromise between buyers and sellers.1' " The information contained
in the Exchange Act filings is essentially the same information that is
required under the 1933 Act's registration provisions. The Commission's
integrated disclosure system, '3 implemented to allow- issuers to simply

116. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(d)(4)(i).
117. Release No. 6839, supra note 7, at 2036.
118. See, Comment Letters, supra note 107.
119. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12g3-2(b).
120. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(d)(4)(i). This 'aspect of Rule 144A drew a stong dissent from
Commissioner Fleischman, see Release No. 6862, supra note 7, as well as concern from the
investment banking'community over marketplace intrusion and potential liability for information that sellers furnish. See H. BLoOMENTHAL, EMERGNG TRENDs iN SEcutrrms LAW 5-17
(1990).
121. Release No. 6839, supra note 7, at 2036.
122. See supra notes 59-70 and accompanying text. This information requirement is, in
theory, inconsistent with Rule 144A's buy-side premise that certain investors are sophisticated
enough to fend for themselves in the market. However, in practice the burden created may
be insubstantial: many non-reporting issuers are likely to have their stock traded in the OTC
market (or pink sheet market), tnggering Rule 15c2-11 which already requires that brokers
have information on issuers available to buyers. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-11 (1990).
123. The Comrmssion's integrated disclosure system has two major features. First, it coordinates required disclosures under the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act, prermsed on the efficient
market hypothesis ("EMH") postulate that information effectively disseminated to the public
will be reflected in share pnces regardless of the source of the data. This provision is
implemented by allowing 1934 Act reporting companies to file streamlined registration forms
under the 1933 Act (Form S-2 or S-3 rather than the longer Form S-I). Second, it contains
generic disclosure items for both the 1933 Act registration and the 1934 Act registration and
reporting requirements (Regulation S-K for nonfinancial information about the issuer and
Regulation S-X for financial information about the issuer). L. Loss & J. SauIN, supra note
58, at 599-621; see also Cohen, The Integrated Disclosure System-Unfinished Business, 40
Bus. LAw. 987 (1985); Gordon & Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information and
Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 761 (1985).
In arguments based upon the efficient market hypothesis, it is important to note that there
are really three versions of the EMH: (1) the strong form, in which prices reflect not just
public information but all information that can be painstakingly obtained through fundamental
analysis of the company and the economy, (2) the semi-strong form, in which prices reflect
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incorporate by reference their 1934 Act filings into a 1933 Act registration

statement, underscores this similarity Providing investors the same information twice increases transaction costs with no corresponding benefit to
the marketplace.

III.

RULE

144A's EFFECT ON THE MARKETPLACE

According to the SEC, "Rule 144A is likely to improve substantially the
efficiency and liquidity of the United States private placement market, and
as a result may well have major implications for financing practices in the
United States of both domestic and foreign issuers."'12 After having examined the current state of financing practice in the United States, with
emphasis on the increasing institutionalization and privatization of the
marketplace, 121 and having looked at the context and operation of Rule

not only past prices but all other published information, and (3) the weak form, in which
prices reflect all information contained in the record of past prices. See R. BREALEY & S.
MYERs, PINcIPLzs OF CORPORATE FINANCE 287-88 (3d ed. 1988).
Research termed "random walk" studies has determined that the market is at least efficient
in the weak sense. Random walk theory about the movement of stock and commodity futures
prices hypothesizes that past prices are of no use in forecasting future price movements, rather,
prices follow a random walk. R. BP.iEAY & S. MYERs, supra, at 282-87 This idea was first
proposed in 1900. See L. BACHELIER, THEORE DE LA SPECULATION, Gauthier-Villars, Pans
(1900), reprinted in Tim RANDOM CHARACTER OF STOCK MARKET PRICES 17-18 (A.J. Boness
trans., P.H. Cootner ed. 1964). Bachelier's mathematical theory of random processes anticipated Einstein's famous work on the random motion of colliding gas molecules by five years.
R. BitALEY & S. MYERS, supra, at 284.
Most researchers agree that the United States markets are at least semi-strong form efficient.
This theory has been tested by determining how quickly the market reacts to specific news
items such as dividend announcements, forecasts of earnings, and mergers. The price reaction
to news and to sales of large blocks of stock seems to be almost immediate. See, e.g., Dann,
Mayers & Raab, Trading Rules, Large Blocks and the Speed of Price Adjustment, 4 J. FIN.
EcON. 3 (1977); Patell & Wolfson, The Intraday Speed of Adjustment of Stock Prices to
Earnings and Dividend Announcements, 13 J. FIN. ECON. 223 (1984).
Whether the United States capital markets are strong form efficient is still debated. If so,
then no investor would be able to make consistently superior forecasts of stock prices. Some
research indicates that this is currently the case on Wall Street. E.g., Bogle & Twardowski,
Institutional Investment Performance Compared: Banks, Investment Counselors, Insurance
Companies, and Mutual Funds, 36 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 33 (1980). Other research points out
anomalies such as New York Stock Exchange specialists and company managers making
consistently superior profits, indicating that U.S. markets are not strong-form efficient. E.g.,
Seyhun, Insiders' Profits, Costs of Trading, and Market Efficiency, 16 J. FIN. EcON. 189
(1986).
The financial and economic research being conducted has a decided impact on the disclosure
policies of the SEC. Although the SEC did not issue a statement addressing the matter, the
SEC began to beef-up its sanctions against insider trading as financial economists began
showing the superior performance of company insiders compared to outside investors. In the
complex field of financial market regulation, the research of economists, corporate finance
scholars, and financial economists greatly informs the SEC's regulatory efforts.
124. Release 6839, supra note 7, at 2029-30.
125. See supra notes 19-54 and accompanying text.

SEC RULE 144A

1990]

144A, 126 this Note takes an ex ante look at the firm-level and macroeconomic
consequences of the new Rule. In exanmng Rule 144A, this section employs
two overlapping levels of analysis: statutory suitability and policy implications.
A.

Rule 144A as a Statutory Response

Considered simply as a response to a gap in existing regulatory structure,
Rule 144A narrows, but does not fill, the existing void. The ambiguity
surrounding the section 4(1-1/2) exemption 27 persists for everyone except
the institutional investors which fall squarely within Rule 144A.21 Rule
144A's definition of "qualified institutional buyer," which requires a minimum of $100 million invested in securities, is likely to be under-inclusive
for determimng whether a buyer is sophisticated. The demands for performance, indeed for survival, in the market make unlikely the possibility that
an institution meeting Rule 144A's definitional criteria will not be sophisticated. 2 9 It is more probable that institutions that are able to fend for
themselves in the marketplace will not have the safe harbor of Rule 144A
available. 130
The underlying philosophy for exempting a transaction from the Securities
Act is that sophisticated investors do not require the protection the Act
offers.' The investor's level of sophistication does not waiver by the stage
of a transaction she is participating in, unless there are differences in the
nature of the transaction that create disclosure variances. By the same token,
her need for the protection of the Act does not change either. The SEC,
however, has adopted different criteria for recognizing sophisticated investors for purposes of initial private placements3 2 than it uses for resales

126. See supra notes 55-124 and accompanying text.
127. See supra notes 84-92 and accompanying text.
128. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(a).
129. See L. LowENsTEmN, supra note 20, at 56-87 (chapter entitled "The Performance
Game").
130. SEC Commissioners Charles Cox and Joseph Grundfest have voiced concerns that the
reproposed Rule 144A is "overly cautious." Levin & Maher, SEC's Modified PrivatePlacement
Rule Aimed at Thrifts, Banks, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., July 17, 1989, at 5. Grundfest
commented that "there are many institutions that won't make this cut and would be fully
capable to fend for themselves and participate." Id. Cox suggested that the investment test be
lowered from $100 million to $25 million. Id. The SEC may change the threshold for the
presumption of sophistication, perhaps in an early amendment. Id.
131. See supra notes 59-70 and accompanying text.
132. The Securities Act uses the term "accredited investor" as a label for investors it deems
able to fend for themselves in the primary market for private placements. Section 2(15) defines
the term "accredited investor." 15 U.S.C. § 77b(15) (1988). Regulation D, Rules 501-703(T),
17 C.F.R. § 230.501-703(') (1990), is the primary regulation for effecting private placement
transactions under the Act. Regulation D defines accredited investor in Rule 501(a)(1)-(8), 17
C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(l)-(8), a more detailed definition than that found in § 2(15).
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under Rule 144A. The SEC has not addressed this inconsistency in Rule
144A's proposal, reproposal, or adopting release.
If Rule 144A transactions were designed as a substitute for public offenngs

of securities, then it is arguable that more "due diligence"' 33 is performed
surrounding the public offering than would be in a Rule 144A transaction.

Thus, adjusting the sophistication standards would be justified. However,
the relevant comparison is with a private placement: Rule 144A addresses

resales of securities acquired in a private placement, not in a public offering-those securities are freely tradeable. There is no justification for
requiring dissimilar standards of disclosure at the issuing stage and the
resale stage of the private transaction. Indeed, if the balance had to tip in

one direction or the other, it would be more appropriate to heighten the
level of scrutiny at the issuing stage. It is at this point that there is the
134
least information available in the market about the issuer.

135
Thus, the appropriate definition of "qualified institutional buyer"'
should be further researched with an eye towards amending the definition

to more closely align it with the definition of "accredited investor" 136 used
under Regulation D 137 and section 4(6)111 of the Act-the two statutory
provisions permitting private placement exemptions. An investor who does

not require the Act's protection when purchasing from the issuer does not
need the Act's protection when purchasing from another party The security

133. Due diligence refers to the process that takes place in the preparation of the issuer's
registration statement (or private placement memorandum), where underwriters and counsel
scrutimze the document and support materials in order to satisfy their duties of care under
the civil liability provisions of the securities laws. See L. Loss & J. SELoIMA, supra note 58,
at 365-67 A due diligence meeting is conducted by the underwriter of a new offenng at which
brokers can ask representatives of the issuer questions about the issuer's background and
financial reliability and the intended use of the proceeds. Increased civil actions against
underwriters and broker-dealers have caused the due diligence meeting to become more than
a perfunctory, hand-shaking affair. Often, several informal due diligence sessions are held,
where top management representatives of the issuer are available to answer the questions of
analysts and institutional investors.
134. Research illustrating the lack of information available about an issuer when pricing an
initial public offering indicates that it is more likely that the market would have less information
to absorb during a primary offering than during a later secondary trade. A private placement
may have even less available information initially. The Initial Public Offering (IPO) market is
a difficult market to understand. Many studies have been done concerning the problem of
pricing of new stock issues due to information inefficiencies. See, e.g., Simon, The Effect of
the 1933 Securities Act on Investor Information and the Performance of New Issues, 79 AM.
ECON. Rnv 295 (1989) (extensive bibliography of research on the new issue market). One
researcher has developed an "implicit insurance hypothesis," which holds that IPOs are
underpriced to serve as a cushion against legal liability and reputational damage to investment
bankers in case the IPO does not perform well. Tinic, Anatomy of Initial Public Offerings of
Common Stock, 43 J. FiN. 789 (1988).
135. 17 C.F.R. § 144A(a).
136. See supra note 132.
137 17 C.F.R. § 230.501-703(T).
138. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6) (1988).
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purchased is identical, regardless of the seller's identity The intermediary
simply has no relevance in the disclosure inquiry, especially when the issuer
is a reporting company under the 1934 Exchange Act'3 9 and information on
the issuer is publicly available.' 4°

B.

Rule 144A as a Policy Tool
1. Effect on Trends

Rule 144A is certain to increase demand for private placements, and, in
turn, since institutions are the domnnant players in the private placement
market, increase the institutionalization of the capital markets. 141 By lowenng
transaction costs'42 and liquidity prenums, 43 Rule 144A will lower the cost
of private placements. Therefore, assuming a downward-sloping demand

curve applies, 1" the number of private placements will increase.

The factional resistance' 45 to Rule 144A reflects the declining transaction

costs: one person's cost is another person's paycheck. Investment bankers,
lawyers, and other intermediaries, who have made handsome profits drafting

complex documents and opimons to march their clients through the legal
grey area of the section 4(1-1/2) exemption, are complaining about Rule

144A when they are not out looking for business.'" Large insurance companies like Prudential and Metropolitan have already started generating

139. See supra note 113.
140. When the author questioned several securities lawyers about whether Rule 144A should
be available for resales of any security of a reporting company, many attorneys replied that
their firms "had taken that position with clients for several years."
141. Maher, SEC, supra note 47, at 18 ("Rule 144A would open the gates wide to new
investors
helping to fuel an even bigger boom in the pnvate market.").
142. Transaction costs include underwriters' fees, legal fees, and the costs saved due to the
speed at which the transaction can be affected. The ability to resell immediately, rather than
wait for a holding period to expire or solicit a no-action letter from the SEC, allows market
participants to take advantage of market fluctuations. Maher, SEC, supra note 47, at 18
(statement by SEC staff about requests from Wall Street firms for no-action letters regarding

resales).
143. See supra note 73.
144. For a basic text on economic principles, see W CURTIS, MICROECONOMWC CONCEPTS
FOR ATTORNYS (1984).
145. See supra note 112.
146. During a panel discussion at the 21st Annual Institute on Securities Regulation held
November 2-4, 1989 in New York City, which the author attended, Francois de Saint Phalle,
of the investment banking firm Dillon, Read & Co., commented that Rule 144A looks to him
like "one more way around the marketing function of Wall Street firms." He then went on
to say that Rule 144A takes revenue out of the securities industry by "shortemng the path
between the capital user and the capital provider." At this point, de Saint Phalle was promptly
cut off by Linda Quinn, the SEC's Director of the Division of Corporate Finance, and staunch
supporter of Rule 144A. Panel Discussion, 21st Annual Institute on Securities Regulation (Nov.
2, 1989).
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private deals to satisfy their own portfolio appetite, even acting as underwriters by syndicating pieces of their deals to smaller institutions. 47 The
challenge for investment bankers is threatening: if they do not add value,
but are simply a step in the process that adds only costs, they will be
bypassed.'4
Not only will the existing players in the market increase the demand for
private placements, but the entrance of a new player-mutual funds-will
increase demand as well. 49 Mutual funds are currently constrained by SEC
regulations 50 to allocate only ten percent or less of their assets to restricted
(illiquid) securities. Unregistered securities are generally considered illiquid
due to their resale restraints.'

However, the mutual fund industry has

successfully lobbied the SEC to give them freedom to invest in the Rule
144A market, since the new Rule will increase the liquidity of privately
placed securities among institutions.152 Several mutual funds have already
held shareholder votes to restructure internal policies to allow investments
in the Rule 144A market.153 Mutual funds, controlling over $470 billion in
funds,'54 could cause a substantial infusion of capital into the private
placement market.
Pension funds represent another industry presently constrained from
investing in illiquid securities.' 55 Pension funds control over $1.9 trillion in
assets, 56 so that even a small percentage increase in pension fund investments
in the private placement market will have an impact. The largest pension
funds, such as the Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association, are already
active participants,57 and others are poised to follow suit once the Rule 144A
market develops.

2.

Macroeconomic Effects

In examining Rule 144A, the difficult issue is not deciding whether it will
increase the trends of privatization and institutionalization, but whether
147 Schwimmer, License to Deal, INVESTMXNT DxA.aRs' DIG., Dec. 18, 1989, at 18, 22;
Michels, Bypassing Wall Street, INESTMEN-T DEALERS' DIG., May 22, 1989, at 14-17.
148. Jessica Palmer, managing director-capital markets at Salomon Brothers stated that
"[t]here are a lot of things at stake here. The test over time is whether the services the Street
provides are worth it or are they not." Michels, supra note 147, at 15.
149. Schwimmer, Mutual Funds Gear Up for 144A, INVESTMENT DEAERs' Di., Nov. 20,
1989, at 13.
150. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-5(a)(1) and 80a-4(2) (1988); Investment Company Act Release
No. 5847 (Oct. 21, 1969) (prudent limit for illiquid securities is 10%).
151. For a discussion of Rule 144A's effect on current mutual fund regulation, see Maher,
SEC, supra note 47, at 19.
152. Schwimmer, supra note 149.
153. Schwimmer, supra note 149.
154. Maher, What is the SEC Stirring Up?, INVESTMENT DEALERS' DIG., Feb. 20, 1989, at
17, 19.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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those increased trends can affect firms, the marketplace, and the economy
in positive ways. Looking at Rule 144A as a policy instrument, this section
will focus on two questions central to that inquiry: First, will Rule 144A
atrophy public disclosure? And second, will Rule 144A improve corporate
governance?
a.

Public Disclosure

Because Rule 144A governs resales, not offerings, of securities, any impact
the Rule has on disclosure standards will be derivative. Although frequently
misunderstood since its proposal, Rule 144A's impact on capital formation
is indirect." 8 The disclosure requirements for public offerings under the
6
1933 Act, 5 9 and continuous reporting requirements under the 1934 Act' 0
are unchanged. Indeed, Rule 415,161 which provides for shelf registrations,
should raise more concerns as it is directed at the primary market. However,
after six years of existence, Rule 415 has not created substantial regulatory
problems but has increased the efficiency of capital formation processes. 62
Rule 144A's effect on public disclosure will be measured by the extent to
which its benefits lure deals to the private placement market that otherwise
would have been done as public offermgs. Capital formation gravitates to
the most efficient method. 63 Decreasing the cost of capital to business frees
funds for other uses such as research and development. Rather than fight

158. See SEC Reauthorization, supra note 46, at 91. David Ruder, Chairman of the SEC
(at the time), had to explain the distinction between resales and pnmary offenngs to Congress,
when asked how he could justify a rule that exempted securities from the Act's disclosure
requirements. Id. However, issuers do receive direct benefit from Rule 144A in that an issuer's
exemption under § 4(2) or Regulation D of the Act will not be comprormsed by a purchaser
who buys securities from the issuer with a view to reselling such securities in a Rule 144A
transaction. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A preliminary note 7.
159. See supra notes 61-70 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 113.
161. 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (1990). For a thorough treatment of issues surrounding Rule 415,
see L. Loss & J. SELIGMAN, supra note 58, at 353-72. Shelf registration permits delayed or
continuous distributions of securities without requinng that a registration statement be filed
each time, thereby allowing issuers to keep securities "on the shelf" and ready to distribute.
The hazard involved is that the information in the prospectus will become stale. The issue of
shelf registrations engendered the Banoff-Fox debate. Compare Banoff, Regulatory Subsidies,
Efficient Markets, and Shelf Registration:An Analysis of Rule 415, 70 VA. L. Rnv 135 (1984)
(supporting Rule 415 on efficiency grounds) with Fox, Shelf Registration,IntegratedDisclosure,
and UnderwriterDue Diligence: An Economic Analysis, 70 VA. L. Rnv 1005 (1984) (a critique
of Banoff's article).
162. Market participants' use of Rule 415 has settled on those transactions for which it is
efficient (usually a debt offenng on a Form S-3). In this context, any loss of due diligence
benefits is negligible due to reduced investor risk in debt offerings and the integrated disclosure
system. L. Loss & J. SEuismAN, supra note 58, at 368.

163. Blackwell & Kidwell, An Investigation of Cost Differences Between Public Sales and
Private Placements of Debt, 22 J. FiN. EcoN. 253, 256 (1988) ("firms mimmize the costs of
issuing securities by selecting the market providing the lowest expected yield on net proceeds").
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market forces, it would be preferable to ensure that public disclosure is not

dampened-the traditional philosophical posture of the federal securities
laws. One way to accomplish this task is by confining Rule 144A to the
securities of issuers that file periodic reports under the Exchange Act, or
requiring the seller to give the buyer that type of information. Rule 144A

is even more restrictive than that at present, since only some securities of
reporting issuers are eligible under the Rule. 164

Rule 144A suffers from timidity: the Rule could be further extended to
allow resales of any security of a reporting company without any loss of

public disclosure standards. Inapplicable to fungible securities, 165 Rule 144A's
primary application will be to non-convertible debt, preferred stock that is
not publicly traded, and foreign securities traded on exchanges outside of
the United States. 16 These restrictions are unnecessary. Privately placed

equity and debt securities are traded every day in a secondary market, 167
even though the identical security is traded in the public securities markets.
The SEC operates under the premise that securities that are traded on

NASDAQ or the over-the-counter market have adequate information that
is publicly available. 68 The SEC should be less concerned, therefore, about
the adequacy of the disclosure for trading in a secondary market confined
to institutional investors. Additionally, the existing exchanges have submitted
rule-change proposals 69 to the SEC in order to establish new marketplaces
for secondary trading that would meet the requirements of Rule 144A. This

market oversight is designed to provide for record-keeping, controls on
settlements, and control of the exit of unregistered securities into the

164. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(d)(3), (4).
165. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A(d)(3)(i).

166. H.
167. H.

BLOOlMNTHA,
BLOOMENTHAL,

supra note 14, at 8-33.
supra note 14, at 8-33.

168. These markets are generally found to be efficient by most analysts, and SEC regulations
of those markets support this belief. See supra note 123 (discussion of the efficient market
hypothesis).
169. Release No. 6806, supra note 7, at 98 n.191. The Amiencan Stock Exchange has
proposed a domestic market for institutional trading of securities called SITUS. SITUS is an
acronym for "System for Institutional Trading of Unregistered Securities." Id. The National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) has developed a NASDAQ-type system for
trading of unregistered securities of major foreign and domestic issuers. NASD calls its system
PORTAL, for "Private Offerings, Resales and Trading through Automated Linkages." Id.
The NASD proposal was sent to the Commssion in two installments for approval. Letters
from Suzanne E. Rothwell, NASD Office of the General Counsel, to Katherine A. England,
SEC Branch Cluef-Over-the-Counter Regulation (Oct. 27, 1989) [hereinafter PORTAL I] and
(Nov. 3, 1989) [hereinafter PORTAL II] (copies on file with the Indiana Law Journal), and
received SEC approval in Exchange Act Release No. 34-27956, 46 SEC Docket 158 (CCH)
(Apr. 27, 1990).
The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) proposed on September 11, 1990 its own Rule 144A
market trading system-the "NYSE System 144A." NYSE Proposes Creation of New System
for Buying, Selling Rule 144A Stocks, 22 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 36, at 1290 (Sept.
14, 1990).
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domestic retail market.170 The National Association of Securities Dealers
(NASD) system-"PORTAL"-the most fully developed at this stage, should
quell any concerns over "leakage" into the retail market of unregistered
171
securities.
Concerns voiced to the SEC that institutional investors will move resources
from the public to private markets 72 are misdirected. The SEC cannot
control this factor in the long run any more than it can control institutions
moving resources to other investment alternatives. Part of successful regulation is knowing what cannot be regulated. The SEC can provide disclosure
standards and can keep the markets free from fraud, but it cannot ensure
their viability single-handedly. SEC policy can boost short-term efficiency
in the markets, but, over time, other variables will determine the level and
type of investment in the economy 7 Macroeconomic forces such as monetary policy, inflation, and interest rates play a far greater role than the
SEC. However, the SEC can work to indirectly influence efficiency in the
markets through policies that help to solve problems such as corporate
inefficiencies. Rule 144A is an excellent tool to increase the level of institutional investment in United States corporations even further and to
encourage additional institutional monitoring of management.
b.

Corporate Governance

As in many cases, those commenting on LBOs and Rule 144A's effect
on the LBO craze seem to have gathered at the extremes, when the reality
lies somewhere in the middle. Evidence indicates that while there has been
some erosion of public ownership of United States corporations, this trend
is not as widespread as Michael Jensen indicates when he welcomes the
eclipse of the public corporation. 74 Neither is the evidence indicating some

170. PORTAL I, supra note 169, at 2. For a good overview of the PORTAL system, see
H. BLoomEN.AL, supra note 122, at 6-1 to 6-23.

171. Several commentators on Rule 144A were concerned over the possibility of "leakage"
of unregistered securities into the retail market. However, under Rule 144, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144,
unregistered securities are allowed to seep into the retail market gradually or completely after
the two-year holding period. See Rule 144(e) (limitations on amount of securities sold) and
Rule 144(d) (holding period). 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.144(e) & 230.144(d). In studies the SEC
performed before proposing Rule 144A, data revealed that leakage would not be a viable
concern. Release No. 6806, supra note 7, at 93. Also, Rule 144A does nothing to disable the
anti-fraud protection of the Act, thereby subjecting unauthorized resales to the Act's sanctions.
Release No. 6806, supra note 7, at 92.
Significant liberalizing amendments to Rule 144's holding period requirement went into
effect along with Rule 144A. The required two-year holding period now runs continuously
from the date of acquisition of a security from an issuer or an affiliate of the issuer. Release
No. 6862, supra note 7, at 49.
172. See Comment Letters, supra note 107.
173. See H. BLooMEisTH,

supra note 14, at 8-33.

174. Jensen, Eclipse, supra note 49, at 52.
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erosion and revamping of the public corporation as dracoman as Jensen's
critics assert. 75 The advent of institutional investors holding large blocks of
shares in corporations can neutralize Jensen's criticisms of the public corporation. Institutions may cause the corporations to become "leaner and
meaner" (perhaps even resembling in some ways the LBO associations that
Jensen heralds as the wave of the future), 76 but the public corporation has
an opportunity to be improved rather than eclipsed as a result of Rule
144A.
The value of the public market, even to investors having access to
relatively liquid private markets, has been proven empirically. 77 Entrepreneurs turn to the public market for a source of capital, partly because of
its efficiency as a provider, but also because of the perceived status of
having a corporation listed on the national exchanges, thereby giving the
public market a degree of inelasticity 178 This inelasticity allows Rule 144A
79
to operate successfully without side-by-side public and private markets
developing simultaneously for the same securities, or without the private
market totally eclipsing the public one. Rule 144A, then, can work to
increase corporations' access to an alternative source of capital in the private

175. See supra notes 53-54 and accompanying text.
176. Jensen, Eclipse, supra note 49, at 69-74. Jensen argues that LBO associations like
Kohlberg, Kravis & Roberts (KKR) are more decentralized than publicly held conglomerates,
rely more on leverage, and are thus able to operate more efficiently. The basis of his argument
is that high leverage forces the business to look to external rather than internal sources of
financing. Debt, then, acts as a monitoring device over management, since any poor performance will make it less likely that their external sources will be willing to invest. Id. Jensen
cites dramatic gains in profit margins and share returns once the corporation has been taken
private by the LBO association. Id. at 70-71. One problem with Jensen's analysis is that he
fails to explain why these operating inefficiencies cannot be corrected while the company is
still publicly held. When management takes the company private, management gains at the
expense of outside shareholders. Jensen implicitly sanctions this premium transfer from the
public shareholders to the insiders.
Jensen's data on seven LBO partnerships show that thirteen professionals and mneteen
nonprofessionals are overseeing twenty-four business units with annual sales of over $i I billion.
Id. at 69. His study also shows that these LBO associations concentrate equity holdings among
managers. Id. While having a stake in the corporation can obviously encourage management's
performance, this concentration of power is anything but "decentralized." It is also unlikely
that these few individuals can oversee the businesses sufficiently. Jensen admits that it "is
physically impossible for KKR and other LBO partnerships to become intimately involved in
the day-to-day decisions of their operating units." Id. Decreasing management involvement is
not likely to increase productivity.
177 See Shah & Thakor, Private vs. Public Ownership: Investment, Ownership Distribution,
and Optimality, 43 J. FIN. 41 (1989).
178. Id. However, whether the demand for liquid public markets is inelastic, and if so, to
what degree, is still open to debate. See Rudnick, supra note 73, at 1180-81 & n.757.
179. The fear of "side-by-side" public and private markets developing that was expressed
in many comment letters on Rule 144A, see supra note 107, caused the SEC to retreat from
allowing fungible equity securities to be traded in reliance on the Rule. H. BLOOMENTHAL,
supra note 14, at 8-32, 8-33. However, the strongest criticism came from the existing exchanges,
fearing loss of business.
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market, with the resulting competition to the public market stimulating
improvements in the public market as a source of funding. s0
Discourse on corporate governance issues centers on the tension between
various corporate constituents, especially management and shareholders.'
Termed agency costs, moral hazard, shirking, free rider, the common pool
problem, or corporate opportunity doctrine,8 2 the basic dilemma is that
everyone is tempted to act in his own self-interest to the detriment of the
whole. Managers, shareholders, employees, and creditors are all self-interested corporate actors. Corporate law, therefore, is centered on imposing
restraint where self-restraint may be lacking. For years, arguments for
shareholders' rights came from the Left. Individuals such as Ralph Nader
advocated shareholders' rights over management, because they assumed that
shareholders' interests were in line with consumer, employee, and community
interests. 8 3 The Left forgot Rule Number One-no one is beyond
temptation. In the wave of hostile takeovers and LBOs, which resulted in
significant premiums to shareholders, the interests of shareholders collided
with other corporate constituencies. However, shareholders were not abandoned. The Right adopted their cause in the name of market efficiency.'1
At this juncture, and despite the new parent, shareholders are still not
effective monitors of corporate management. Corporate productivity is
declimng, and the United States status in international competition has
fallen as well." 5 However, as Rule 144A successfully increases the attractiveness of the private placement market, and firms turn to that market as
a source of capital, institutions are positioned to become a more potent
force in corporate governance.' ' Private placements are individually negotiated
180. See Blackwell & Kidwell, supra note 163.
181. Coffee, supra note 15.
182. E.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, CorporateControl Transactions, 91 YAIE L.J. 698 (1982);
Jensen & Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBehavior, Agency Costs and Ownership
Structure, 3 J. FiN. EcoN. 305 (1976).
183. Peter Rona, President and CEO of IBJ Schroder Bank & Trust, chromcles well the
changing guard of shareholders in a letter to the HarvardBusiness Review. HARv Bus. Rgv.,
Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 197-201.
184. E.g., Jensen, Eclipse, supra note 49.
185. L. LowENsTEIN, supra note 20, at 98-118.

186. This trend has already begun, witnessed in part by the recent proxy battle between NL
Industnes and Lockheed Corporation. See J. Martin, The Lessons of NL Versus Lockheed
(May 18, 1990) (unpublished manuscript presented at the Salomon Brothers Center and Rutgers
Centers Conference on The Fiduciary Responsibilities of InstitutionalInvestors) (copy on file
with the Indiana Law Journal).
Institutional investors as forces in corporate governance are becoming a popular topic of
inquiry. See, e.g., R. Gilson & R. Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda
for Institutional Investors (June 5, 1990) (unpublished manuscript presented at the Salomon
Brothers Center and Rutgers Centers Conference on The Fiduciary Responsibilities of Institutional Investors) (copy on file with the Indiana Law Journal); Block, Proxy Contests and
Institutional Investors (June 14-15, 1990) (unpublished manuscript presented at the Salomon
Brothers Center and Rutgers Centers Conference on The Fiduciary Responsibilities of Institutional Investors) (copy on file with the Indiana Law Journal).
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transactions.18 7 With a relatively limited market of buyers qualified to deal
in the private placement market, a corporation will be forced to take notice
of institutions' demands or risk losing a source of capital. In the web of
institutional relationships,"'8 one disgruntled source could carry over to
several unanswered phone calls when it comes time to raise additional
capital.
Improvements in existing proxy rules, 18 9 such as those recently being
advanced to give institutions increased access to the proxy
machinery, 190 would bolster an institution's ability to effectively monitor

187 See Nash, Institutional Private Placements: A Legal Overview, in PEACTISiNG LAW
PRivATE PLACEM:ENTs 1989, at 133. One of the benefits of a private placement over
a public offenng is the ability to tailor the terms of the financing for the specific issue. Often,
event-risk protection can be negotiated that would not be possible in a public offering to
dispersed investors. See Michels, supra note 147, at 14 (Metropolitan able to negotiate for
event-risk protection).
188. The President of Prudential Power Funding Associates, a large direct purchaser of
utility-related private placements, commented that "[y]ou can really put it to a guy on one
deal but you can only do it once.
There's so much Monday morning quarterbacking going
on now. There's more commumcation
" Schwimmer, supra note 147, at 22.
189. Proxy rules are contained in § 14 of the Exchange Act. 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1988). A
proxy statement is information that the SEC requires the board of directors to provide to
shareholders before they vote by proxy on company matters. The statement contains proposed
amendments to articles of incorporation or other items of business that require a shareholder
vote. In the takeover context, the proxy is used to persuade shareholders to vote for either
incumbent management or the acquirer. See L. Loss & J. SELGMAN, supra note 58, at 69395, 738-39, 1258-59.
The SEC's rule-making power in the proxy arena is arguably stronger than the problematic
Rule 19c-4 (one share/one vote) area because of the explicit Congressional authorization under
§ 14(a) of the Exchange Act for the SEC to enter the realm of corporate governance. The
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recently invalidated Rule 19c-4 in
Business Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990). For discussion regarding the
SEC's power in the proxy arena in Business Roundtable, see id. at 416-20.
190. See Letter from Ralph Whitworth, Director of Umted Shareholders Association, to the
Harvard Business Review. HAv. Bus. REv., Nov.-Dec. 1989, at 183-84 (discussing proposals
for allowing access to company-sponsored proxy materials for shareholders representing three
percent or more of a company's equity and for allowing confidential voting in elections so
that shareholders may vote without fear of economic retribution).
Elmer W Johnson, a semor partner in the Chicago law firm Kirkland & Ellis and member
of the New York Stock Exchange's Legal Advisory Committee, has proposed an exemption
from the proxy rules for private solicitations among sophisticated holders-an exemption that
would mirror the definition of "qualified institutional buyer" under Rule 144A. Johnson
advocates improvements in the proxy process to encourage long-term investors to exercise their
power of voice rather than their power of exit in monitoring management. Johnson, An
Insider's Call for Outside Direction, Hhv Bus. REv., Mar.-Apr. 1990, at 46; see also E.
Johnson & R. Osborne, Revitalizing the Board of Directors (May 17, 1990) (unpublished
manuscript presented at the Salomon Brothers Center and Rutgers Centers Conference on The
Fiduciary Responsibilities of Institutional Investors) (copy on file with the Indiana Law
Journal).
The Califorma Public Employees' Retirement System (CalPERS) has recently proposed
revisions to the federal proxy rules. See Letter from CalPERS to the SEC, Nov. 3, 1989 (copy
on file with the Indiana Law Journal); Letter from the American Bar Association to the SEC,
Apr. 27, 1990 (commenting on the CaIPERS proposal) (copy on file with the Indiana Law
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management. Institutions' power will be an effective foil for management
and can resolve some of the agency problems that widely dispersed shareholders are not capable of resolving.
Assuming institutions do begin to take a more active role in monitoring
management, with whose interests- are institutions aligned? This issue is
complicated by the varying natures of institutions. Some institutional investors operate foremost as conduits for individuals, whereas others operate
principally as a separate entity. To borrow terms from economic literature,
"[f]inancial institutions range from transparent through translucent to
opaque."' 19' Considering the individual as the "simplest and most transparent
institution,"'12 mutual funds would be the most nearly transparent, insurance
companies and banks the most opaque, and pension funds in the middletranslucent.' 93 The further the institution is from the model of the individual
investor, the less likely that retail forces and individual portfolio optimization will be dominant.'9
This consideration, that an institution may be more than the sum of its
parts, could have major implications for modem portfolio theory'95 as
applied to an institutional market. Each premise that is based on assumptions
about the unconstrained individual would have to be reevaluated for applicability to institutions. Modem portfolio theory essentially drives much of
the current regulation of the capital markets.'9 Factoring institutions qua
institutions into the analysis represents an area for continuing research, and,
perhaps, responsive regulatory changes. Yet, this insight may simply transfer
our realm of discourse from the monitoring of one institution-the public

Journal); see also Dent, Toward Unifying Ownership and Control in the Public Corporation,
1989 Wis. L. Rev. 881 (proposing giving control of the proxy voting system to the publicly
held corporation's largest shareholders as a means of resolving separation of ownership and
control problems).
191. Ross, InstitutionalMarkets, FinancialMarketing, and FinancialInnovation, 44 J. Fni.
541, 542 (1989) (Because of "agency theoretic relations, institutional behavior in financial
markets is not a simple reflection of the preference structures of individuals.").
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 542-44.
195. Modem portfolio theory is based on two valuation models. One is the Capital Asset
Pricing Model ("CAPM"). This model was created to be used as a benchmark in assessing
the distinction between systematic and unsystematic risk, against which the performance of a
portfolio can be measured. The major difficulty in testing the CAPM is that the model is
stated in terms of investors' expectations, not in terms of realized returns. V. BRumDY & M.
CmEtnsmw, supra note 75, at 101. CAPM employs beta as a risk measure. High beta stocks
tend to be priced to yield correspondingly lgh rates of return. Id.
Another useful model is Arbitrage Pricing Theory (APT), developed by Steven Ross. Ross,
The Arbitrage Theory of CapitalAssetPricing, 13 J.EcoN. THEoRY 341 (1976). For a summary
of APT, see R. BRAn.EY & S. MYERs, supra note 123, at 163-64.
As Ross' research has just begun to explore, these models are based on individual investors.
Ross, supra note 191, at 541, 555-56.
196. See generally Bratton, Corporate Debt Relationships: Legal Theory in a Time of
Restructuring, 1989 DuKE L.J. 92.
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corporation-to the monitoring of another-the various institutional investors that Rule 144A addresses.
CONCLUSION

In promulgating Rule 144A, the SEC admitted that it had "not until
now . . formally addressed the difference between the institutional and
public resale markets. The institutional resale market for restricted securities has evolved to a point where its existence should be acknowledged." 197 It is perhaps this recognition, more than the substance of Rule
144A itself, that has sparked so much controversy. The radical restructuring of the United States capital markets in the last decade did not
escape notice-but the SEC's imprimatur made it real. As this Note
documents in Part I, the transformation is real. The capital markets have
been significantly altered by the emerging dominance of the institutional
investor and the private placement financing alternative.
The SEC is to be commended for addressing these changes through
Rule 144A. The Rule's premise, that professional institutions are able to
make investment decisions without the protection mandated by the registration requirement of the Securities Act, is consistent with the historical
philosophy of the federal securities laws. However, the Commission
should trust its own instincts. By responding to pressure from various
interest groups, the SEC has threatened to undermine the positive consequences the Rule could have if adopted in a form closer to that originally
proposed. The federal securities laws function best when the Securities
Act and the Exchange Act function harmoniously. Extending Rule 144A
to cover resales (to a qualified institutional buyer) of any security issued
by a company subject to the reporting requirements of the Exchange Act
will help to accomplish this objective. Further, amending Rule 144A's
definition of qualified institutional buyer to more closely resemble Regulation D's accredited investor definition is also warranted. These extensions will allow the SEC to properly mediate between unnecessary restraints
on alienation in the form of resale restrictions and adequate protection
of investors.
The federal securities laws have operated successfully for over fifty
years. To continue that track record, the SEC must continue to recognize
that securities law must be multidimensional. It must operate at many
levels to be efficient, and it must be finely calibrated to reach various
market participants at the level in which they operate in the capital

197. Release No. 6806, supra note 7, at 85.
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markets. By creating Rule 144A, the SEC recogmzed that not all investors
have equal tolerances to the heat of the market. Institutional investors
are able to hold their hands closer to the fire without being burned: Rule
144A has paved the way for their approach.

